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ABSTRACT 
 Recent conflicts have directed much academic and media attention to special 
operations forces (SOF). Despite the attention, the application of SOF in asymmetric 
conventional warfare or irregular conflict has not been fully examined in the context of 
just war theory. In addition, SOF have often been portrayed superficially, painting them 
as indiscriminate or unscrupulous warriors. This thesis argues to the contrary, that the 
application of SOF represents an evolution of just war theory in an era of increasingly 
irregular conflict. This thesis expands just war thinking to activities short of armed 
conflict. It contends that SOF constitute a unique extension of the ethical principles that 
morally bind military capabilities under just war theory. Moreover, this thesis examines 
the moral utility of SOF operations as a means of preventing unnecessary loss of life 
prior to, during, and in the wake of armed conflict. SOF can function, in both theory and 
practice, as a distinct moral improvement over most other forms of irregular or indirect 
conflict, across nearly all phases of conflict. These conclusions aim to provide insight to 
planners, observers, and policy-makers who seek to understand and efficiently respond to 
emergent or persistent challenges to global stability and national security. 
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Recent conflicts have directed much academic and media attention to special 
operations forces (SOF). Despite the attention, the application of SOF in asymmetric 
conventional warfare or irregular conflict has not been fully examined in the context of just 
war theory. In addition, SOF have often been portrayed superficially, painting them as 
indiscriminate or unscrupulous warriors. This thesis argues to the contrary, that the 
application of SOF represents an evolution of just war theory in an era of increasingly 
irregular conflict. The arguments presented demonstrate the need to expand just war theory 
and extend just war thinking to activities below the level of armed conflict. It also contends 
that SOF constitute a unique extension of the ethical principles that morally bind military 
capabilities under just war theory. Moreover, the work examines the moral utility of SOF 
operations as a means to prevent unnecessary loss of life prior to, during, and in the wake 
of armed conflict scenarios. The thesis concludes that SOF can function, in both theory and 
practice, as a distinct moral improvement over most other forms of irregular or indirect 
conflict, across nearly all phases of the Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) continuum of 
conflict, most especially when applied to activities below the level of armed conflict in 
Phase Zero.1  These conclusions aim to provide insight to planners, observers, and policy-
makers who seek to understand and efficiently respond to emergent or persistent challenges 
to global stability and national security. 
Just war theory has long served as a foundation for debating the morality of war. 
Over time militaries, particularly Western ones, have adopted many of the principles and 
concepts of the just war tradition. This adoption has resulted in clear components of just 
war thinking into DoD documents, for example, the Law of Armed Conflict as described 
                                                 
1 The continuum of conflict lists six phases of conflict, the continuum and phases are described in 
more depth in the Joint Publications 3-0 and 5-0. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, Joint 
Operations (Suffolk, VA: United States Department of Defense, United States Joint Forces Command, 
Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Doctrine Group, 2006); Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0, Joint 
Operational Planning (Suffolk, VA: United States Department of Defense, United States Joint Forces 
Command, Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Doctrine Group, 2017). The U.S. DoD defines Phase Zero as, 
“Shape (Phase 0). Joint and multinational operations—inclusive of normal and routine military activities—
and various interagency activities are performed to dissuade or deter potential adversaries and to assure or 
solidify relationships with friends and allies.” Joint Chiefs of Staff, xxiii. 
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in the DoD Law of War Manual.2 By examining SOF core activities and how they are 
constructed during overt warfare or armed conflict, it is apparent that this thesis confirms 
the applicability of just war thinking and further establishes its adequate and 
comprehensive ability to analyze the nuances of SOF in armed conflict. On the other hand, 
more recent scholarship by so-called revisionist just war theorists has added new and ever 
more demanding elements for consideration when an armed conflict is irregular in nature, 
as we commonly see in contemporary counter-insurgency (COIN) or counter-terrorism 
(CT) campaigns and operations.3 A common critique of such revisionist thinking is that it 
makes executing irregular warfare so restrictive as to impede one’s ability to efficiently 
prosecute the war—and ultimately end it.4 However, it is possible that this assessment of 
revisionist thinking may be disproportionately focused on the assumption of large-scale 
combat forces executing major operations or campaigns as the primary means to achieve 
success. This thesis demonstrates that applying SOF in support of large-scale combat 
operations may yield a degree of moral utility that allows a military force to approach the 
discrimination and enhanced proportionality required by revisionist thinking.5  
Moreover, this thesis establishes that SOF, for both practical and moral reasons, 
can and should be used in competition below the level of armed conflict.6 In fact, it 
                                                 
2 Department of Defense, Department of Defense Law of War Manual (Washington, D.C.: General 
Counsel of the Department of Defense Washington United States, 2015). 
3 Jeff McMahan, Killing in War (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2011); Ryan Jenkins, Michael 
Robillard, and Bradley Jay Strawser, Who Should Die? The Ethics of Killing in War (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, Forthcoming). 
4 Straswer notes the difficulty of executing modern conflict within a just war context. See Bradley Jay 
Strawser, “Walking the Tightrope of Just War,” Analysis 71, no. 3 (July 1, 2011): 533–44, 
https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anr070. 
5 The U.S. DoD defines irregular warfare in JP 1-02 as, “A violent struggle among state and non-state 
actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Also called IW.” Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Suffolk, VA: 
United States Department of Defense, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, 
Joint Doctrine Group, 2017). 
6 Colonel (ret.) Brian Petit describes practical advantages that can be gained using SOF in Phase Zero. 
Lieutenant General (ret.) James Dubik does not specifically identify moral advantages of SOF in Phase 
Zero, some of the concepts her describes are applied to SOF by the author in this thesis. Brian S. Petit, 
Going Big by Getting Small: The Application of Operational Art by Special Operations in Phase Zero 
(Denver, Colorado: Outskirts Press, 2013); James M. Dubik, Just War Reconsidered: Strategy, Ethics, and 
Theory (University of Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 2016). 
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concludes that, given the choice, the whole of the United States (U.S.) government should 
choose to invest more heavily in Phase Zero when considering the preponderance of SOF 
employment and application.7 In this case, there is the potential to receive a much higher 
“return on investment,” in that success in Phase Zero precludes the escalations leading to 
subsequent phases of conflict, including overt warfare, that require the deployment of 
large-scale combat forces. From a practical standpoint, approaching problems in this way 
uses only a fraction of the usual resources expended, in line with the traditional SOF 
operating principle economy of force to achieve positive outcomes.8 Of course, this is a 
strong utilitarian point in and of itself—however, this thesis argues that there is an 
additional return on investment that is realized by the moral utility achieved by investing 
in Phase Zero.9  
One of the primary goals in Phase Zero is to avoid the expansion of conflict or the 
onset of armed conflict all-together. This type of outcome can be described as morally 
superior to the goal of other phases in the continuum of conflict. However, in the case that 
this goal is not realized, Phase Zero can limit the scope of violence required to achieve 
victory in Phase Two and beyond. When compared to protracted large-scale combat 
operations, this result is also morally superior to the alternative. Effective Phase Zero work 
succeeds in that it is designed to operationalize the integrated country strategies designed 
by the Department of State’s (DOS) foreign affairs and diplomatic missions abroad.10 Each 
National Security Strategy (NSS) since the Clinton Administration makes clear that the 
                                                 
7 Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates advocated for a similar investment in Phase Zero 
capability within the DOS. “Transcript | Robert Gates | Speakers | Landon Lecture Series | Kansas State 
University,” November 26, 2007, https://www.k-state.edu/landon/speakers/robert-gates/transcript.html. 
8 Economy of force refers to the effective application of military capabilities to reduce a problem. 
Generally speaking, the idea is to yield as many positive results using as little military capability and 
resources as possible.  
9 Moral utility is the author’s term to describe the comparative advantage, specifically in terms of 
morality, using one military method versus another to achieve the desired military or political endstate. 
10 The term operationalize is military jargon to describe a deliberate planning and execution process 
of a series of tasks designed to provide measurable and quantifiable results based on a strategy delivered by 
a higher headquarters or other government agency responsible for providing strategic goals, objectives, 
direction, and vision. In this case, the DOS Missions abroad (during normal diplomatic relations) design 
integrated country strategies approved by U.S. Ambassadors, SOF operationalize parts of the strategy by 
analyzing the assigned goals and developing a plan, which is briefed back to the U.S. Embassy Country 
Team, on how SOF plan to achieve some of the objectives identified in the integrated country strategy.  
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U.S. Government believes that engagement can help to promote the sovereignty and 
autonomy of allied and partner nations worldwide, which in turn promotes regional security 
and stability.11 The U.S. Government, of course, adopted many of these concepts from 
ideas like soft power, popularly described by Joseph Nye—seeking to create stabilizing 
influences by reinforcing international norms and conventions.12 The U.S. experience in 
and the successful outcome of the Cold War likely shaped the aim and tenor of the 
subsequent NSS’ emphases on regional stability, and their ambitions for achieving 
influence. 
SOF in Phase Zero help to enable the exercise of sovereignty in other nations by 
assisting allied and partner nations’ security forces across a range of specialized tasks.13 
First, SOF facilitate increased internal security force capability and capacity by executing 
foreign internal defense or security force assistance. These activities provide specific and 
focused training tailored to the needs of the ally or partner and facilitate the development 
of precise and nuanced skills to counter subversive elements. Second, and depending on 
the level of capability and capacity of a host-nation security force, SOF can facilitate the 
discovery of adversarial clandestine or covert activities occurring within their nation aimed 
at subverting their autonomy. Third, SOF and host-nation security forces can begin to 
                                                 
11 William J. Clinton, “A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement” (Washington, 
DC: Executive Office of the President Washington DC, 1994), http://nssarchive.us/national-security-
strategy-1994/; William J. Clinton, “A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement” 
(Washington, D.C.: Executive Office of the President, 1995), http://nssarchive.us/national-security-
strategy-1995/; William J. Clinton, “A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement” 
(Washington, D.C.: Executive Office of the President, 1996), http://nssarchive.us/national-security-
strategy-1996/; William J. Clinton, “A National Security Strategy for a Global Age” (Washington, D.C.: 
Executive Office of the President, 2000), http://nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-2000/; George W. 
Bush, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America” (Washington, DC: Executive 
Office of the President Washington DC, 2002), http://nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-2002/; 
George W. Bush, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America” (Washington, DC: 
Executive Office of the President Washington DC, March 2006), http://nssarchive.us/national-security-
strategy-2006/; Obama, Barack, “National Security Strategy” (Washington, D.C.: Executive Office of the 
President, May 2010), http://nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-2010/; Obama, Barack, “National 
Security Strategy” (Washington, D.C.: Executive Office of the President, February 2015), 
http://nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-2015/. 
12 Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York, NY: Public Affairs, 
2004). 
13 Petit, Going Big by Getting Small; United States Army Special Operations Command, “USASOC 
Strategy 2035” (USASOC G5, April 2016), http://www.soc.mil/Assorted%20Pages/USASOC%20Strategy-
2035.pdf. 
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identify threats, warnings, and indicators that greatly aid their national decision-making 
authorities as well as DOS foreign affairs and diplomatic missions in having a clear and 
comprehensive understanding of emergent or persistent challenges. Finally, SOF in Phase 
Zero can aid in the positive attribution of adversarial activities below the level of armed 
conflict.14  
With respect to just war theory, this thesis identifies that these goals and objectives 
are morally permissible, and further that they provide a strong justification for an expansion 
of the theory itself. Particularly, just war theory does not address the morality of 
competition below the level of armed conflict. This thesis recommends that just war 
thinking be expanded to include the concepts of jus ad conflictum and jus in conflictus. 
These two extensions would cover, respectively, the moral principles and criteria 
governing justification for entering into such competition, and those governing permissible 
actions within that competition. The aim of the work is to focus more academic attention 
and discussion on the morality of entering into a competition below the level of armed 
conflict as well as the morality of actions and activities that occur below the level of armed 
conflict. Although this thesis by no means treats the constituent elements of these concepts 
exhaustively, rather, it should be viewed as an appeal to just war theorists for a more 
thorough exchange regarding the moral implications of competition below the level of 
armed conflict.  
Although this thesis only begins to explore the outline such extensions of just war 
theory would take, some clear moral criteria are apparent. Considering jus ad conflictum 
from a traditional just war theory perspective, the objectives SOF pursue in Phase Zero 
                                                 
14 United States Special Operations Command, “USSOCOM 2020 Strategy” (USSOCOM G5, 2013); 
Training and Doctrine Command United States Army, Combined Arms Center United States Army, and 
Combat Development Division United States Marine Corps, “Multi-Domain Battle: Evolution of 
Combined Arms for the 21st Century 2025-2040” (United States Army, Combined Arms Center, 
Forthcoming). 
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reinforce international norms and conventions that support the legalist paradigm.15 The 
legalist paradigm is an element of traditional just war theory that articulates every nation’s 
moral right to sovereignty and self-determination, free from the imposition of another 
nation’s will—an imposition of will on another sovereign entity is identified by just war 
thinking as national aggression and runs contrary to the legalist paradigm.16 According to 
just war logic, national aggression can usually be a justified casus belli under the frame of 
jus ad bellum.17 If we consider this from a revisionist just war theory perspective, these 
same objectives represent a just intent in that they are aimed at preserving autonomy as 
opposed to imposing will through coercion. Further discussion on the subject could reveal 
scenarios in which imposing one’s will through coercion, depending on adversary actions, 
may be morally permissible. These basic concepts could form the fundamental elements of 
jus ad conflictum.  
Similarly, jus in conflictus might also include an apparent traditionalist and 
revisionist component—just practices. Just practices are acts that are grounded in 
proportionality and discrimination, meaning that one should seek always to limit the scope 
of potential negative effects to those whose status is that of a legitimate target thus limiting 
the exposure of innocents to the negative effect.18 SOF in Phase Zero competing below the 
level of armed conflict take action in very limited instances making these principles much 
easier to attain than in large-scale combat operations. Since Phase Zero campaign activities 
are aimed at working by, with, and through Ally and Partner nation security forces, it 
produces a multilateral affect that promotes influence. By this concept, attempts at coercion 
                                                 
15 Walzer briefly establishes the concept of the legalist paradigm in his seminal work, see Michael 
Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books, 1977). Walzer further refines this concept in later 
works as a response to academic discourse on his writing and again in the new millennium. See Michael 
Michael Walzer, “The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 
9, no. 3 (Spring 1980): 209–29; Michael Walzer, Arguing about War (New Haven & London: Yale 
University Press, 2004). 
16 Walzer, Arguing about War. 
17 Casus belli is the Latin of cause for war and jus ad bellum the Latin of right to war. Both terms 
have been used in just war tradition as early as St. Augustine’s work on the subject.  
18 This concept, limited for brevity, has a great deal of literature behind a recent discussion as to the 
finer points of who is justifiably liable in war and when. To see the latest comprehensive argumentation on 
the subject, see the forthcoming work, Jenkins, Robillard, and Strawser, Who Should Die? The Ethics of 
Killing in War. 
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could be an unjustified action under jus in conflictus—however, I will suggest that coercion 
may be morally permissible under certain conditions. Although not directly treated in this 
thesis, the use of cyber “armas” or other irregular means to achieve influence effects below 
the level of armed conflict might also be analyzed through the frame of the proposed 
expansion.  
This thesis further argues that competition below the level of armed conflict can be 
morally justifiable, but even when justified it is still subject to moral criticism. We find this 
to be the case in this thesis’ treatment of Russia’s activities in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. 
Chapter IV contains a detailed account of Russian actions below the level of armed conflict 
during the Euromaidan and its transition to and continuing armed conflict in Eastern 
Ukraine. It further concludes that Russia’s actions, even given the limited and rudimentary 
characterization of jus ad conflictum and jus in conflictus sketched in Chapter III, not only 
violated those principles—but exceeded the bounds of Phase Zero at their onset and should 
be regarded as coercion, political warfare, and armed conflict. A notable element of 
Russian activities in Ukraine, identified in Chapter IV, is the Russian Federation’s lexical 
use of just war theory thinking in media releases and talking points.19 This characteristic 
is further justification for SOF employment in Phase Zero for attributional purposes. 
Without clear and definitive proof of clandestine or covert activities below the level of 
armed conflict in an allied or partner nation, calling immoral actors to account and exposing 
their aggression is impossible—leaving the aggressor to leverage the just war tradition for 
utilitarian and immoral objectives unchallenged and the compromised nation limited 
options to respond legitimately or appeal for justified intervention on their behalf.  
Finally, this work concludes that competition below the level of armed conflict 
conducted within the moral framework of jus ad conflictum and jus in conflictus might not 
                                                 
19 Josh Cohen, “Vladimir Putin Calls Ukraine Fascist, and Country’s New Law Helps Make His 
Case,” Reuters, May 14, 2015, http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/05/14/putin-ties-ukraines-
government-to-neo-nazis-a-new-law-seems-to-back-him-up/; Andrea Chalupa, “Putin’s Fabricated Claim 
of a Fascist Threat in Ukraine,” Forbes, April 4, 2014, 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2014/04/04/putins-fabricated-claim-of-a-fascist-threat-in-ukraine/; 
Team of the Official Website of the President of Russia, “Vladimir Putin Answered Journalists’ Questions 
on the Situation in Ukraine,” Russian Government, President of Russia, March 14, 2014, 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20366. 
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constitute an “intervention” in the traditional just war sense. In Chapter IV, the proposed 
framework demonstrates that Russia’s actions constitute an unjustified intervention. This 
thesis further concludes that an overall increase in the U.S. whole-of-government approach 
to Phase Zero capability and capacity is warranted.20 SOF employment in Phase Zero has 
the potential to facilitate positive outcomes in support of national objectives and the DOS’ 
foreign affairs and diplomatic mission’s integrated country strategies in a capacity that is 
morally preferable to other means. In light of this, this thesis also concludes that there is a 
strong possibility that this preferential status makes the ethical conduct of Phase Zero not 
only morally permissible but morally imperative.  
                                                 
20 Whole of government approach refers to the idea that the government should apply unified and 
comprehensive solutions across agencies and departments.   
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I. THINKING ABOUT COMPETITION BELOW THE LEVEL OF 
ARMED CONFLICT 
On June 6, 1944, nearly 800,000 Allied Soldiers, Sailors, and Airmen participated 
in or supported landing operations in Normandy, France, to begin an offensive in Europe 
to defeat fascism. Warships, landing craft, air cover and support, tanks, artillery, and 
infantry seized the beaches in the largest invasion in history. This day, also known as 
D-Day, is etched into the collective memory of Americans through media and popular 
culture and reinforces popular perceptions of armed conflict—so much so that, when 
contemporary observers and practitioners think of our conception of warfare, we visualize 
large battles fought between competitors who are somewhat equally matched: tank on tank, 
uniformed men with guns set against other uniformed men with guns. In many respects, 
this example serves as the archetypal scenario of what joint military doctrine terms a major 
operation within a campaign during large-scale combat operations.1  
Such campaigns or major operations are conducted in six phases laid out in joint 
military doctrine.2 See Figure 1 for a graphical depiction of the Continuum of Conflict. 
Contemporary military professionals use the phases to describe how the Department of 
Defense (DoD) moves from steady-state, or normalized diplomatic relations, to major 
combat operations, to the original normalized state once again.3 With D-Day in mind, 
consider the DoD’s phrase “Seize the Initiative” to describe Phase Two in the continuum.4 
Phase Two is the point at which a combatant in an armed conflict conducts joint reception, 
staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSO&I) of major combat forces—this is the 
                                                 
1 The U.S. DoD defines major operations in the Joint Publication 1-02 and 3-0 as, “1. A series of 
tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by combat forces of a single or several Services, 
coordinated in time and place, to achieve strategic or operational objectives in an operational area. 2. For 
noncombat operations, a reference to the relative size and scope of a military operation.” Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, Joint Publication 1-02. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0. 
2 The U.S. DoD defines campaigns in Joint Publication 5-0 as, “A series of related major operations 
aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space. See also campaign 
plan. (JP 5-0).” Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0. 
3 Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
4 Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
 2 
beginning of what most people regard as an actual war in the continuum.5 This is the point 
in a campaign or major operation where conventional military forces conduct offensive 
maneuvers to quickly force an adversarial military force into a defensive posture and then 
set the conditions for the third phase, “dominate”—or in other words, shock and awe.6 
Doubtless, there are times when conventional military capability is required to 
confront and succeed against a competitor with near-peer capabilities. However, there are 
also times when the United States could avoid the expense, effort, and potentially 
disadvantageous second and third order consequences by shaping the environment during 
peacetime, well before such a phase of conflict ever occurs.  
                                                 
5 Joint Chiefs of Staff; Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0. 
6 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0. 
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Figure 1.  Notional Operation Plan Phases Overlaid on the 
Continuum of Conflict7 
A. WHERE WE ARE 
America may be nearing completion of its longest foreign war in history. While 
observers know it simply as the global war on terror or GWOT, the DoD now characterizes 
it as a global contingency operation.8 The war has entered its seventeenth year in 
Afghanistan and questions remain as to the ethics and morals of that conflict, not to mention 
when and how we can successfully end it, if ever. The war has endured through three 
presidential administrations and resulted in a significant expenditure of human-capital and 
                                                 
7 Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0. 
8 Scott Wilson and Al Kamen, “‘Global War On Terror’ Is Given New Name,” Washington Post, 
March 25, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/03/24/AR2009032402818.html. 
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resources. Arguably, one of the most important aspects of this war is the re-invigorated 
public debate and academic focus on the morality of war in general.9  
Yet, while the world has been focused on the war in Afghanistan, it has also seen 
several destabilizing events that have, and will continue to have, profound impacts on inter-
state and non-state interactions in the future. As the U.S. and its Allies have dutifully 
attempted to curb terrorism through combined counter terrorism operations, several state 
actors have undertaken significant operations to gain territory—actions that several authors 
like George Friedman had previously theorized were not likely to occur and therefore be 
an unlikely cause of contemporary war.10 Contemporary examples of this include 
expansionist ambitions and policy in the South China Sea practiced by China or the 
continued attempts by the Russian Federation to impose its will on former Soviet Satellite 
Republics. At present, China’s “reef enhancements” in the East China Sea have produced 
only greater international tensions that have the potential to cause serious instability. 
Russia’s actions since the early 1990s have also resulted in volatility, producing armed 
conflict in Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Ukraine, to name only a few regions 
in conflict.  
Collectively, these conflicts have rightly directed academic and media attention to 
special operations forces (SOF). Yet despite the attention, the application of SOF has not 
been adequately examined in the context of just war theory.11 In addition, SOF have been 
characterized in superficial, rather than analytic, representations. For example, authors like 
Matthew Cole and Matthieu Aikins, as well as United Nations (UN) Delegates like Lydia 
                                                 
9 The quantity and impact of academic work on just war theory over the past 15 years has been 
significant. Two major figures in moral analytic philosophy, David Rodin and Jeff McMahan, are most 
responsible for the resurgence of research and, particularly, the development of so-called revisionist just 
war theory, as discussed below. See, in particular, McMahan, Killing in War. David Rodin, War and Self-
Defense (GB: Clarendon Press, 2002), https://doi.org/10.1093/0199257744.001.0001. Countless others 
have followed in this revisionist school, some of which will be engaged with below, as relevant to this 
thesis. 
10 George Friedman, “Beyond the Post-Cold War World,” Stratfor, April 2, 2013, 
https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/beyond-post-cold-war-world. 




Canaan, portray SOF as an indiscriminate killing machine that produces civilian casualties 
on a wide-scale.12 Canaan views SOF as tools used and applied only by hawkish political 
leaders, suggesting the use of special operations constitutes a temporary suspension of the 
moral precepts that underpin law.13 Another similar distortion appears to come from the 
notion that SOF conduct secret warfare that, by definition, would violate the sovereignty 
of other nations.14 Given the sometimes-opaque nature of SOF, these are easy 
misconceptions to perpetuate.15  
However, despite such depictions in popular discourse, and because of SOF’s small 
scale and precise capabilities, SOF are purpose-designed for limited-objective outcomes 
that inherently bound the scope of violence.16 The heightened level of precision, focus, 
                                                 
12 Matthieu Aikins, “US Special Forces May Have Gone On a Murder Spree in Afghanistan—Did the 
Army Cover It Up?,” Nation, September 2, 2015, https://www.thenation.com/article/us-special-forces-may-
have-gone-on-a-murder-spree-in-afghanistan-did-the-army-cover-it-up/; Matthew Cole, “The Crimes of 
SEAL Team 6,” Intercept, January 10, 2017, https://theintercept.com/2017/01/10/the-crimes-of-seal-team-
6/. 
13 Lydia Canaan, “Fighting Terrorism Without Violating Human Rights,” Huffington Post, March 21, 
2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/lydia-canaan/fighting-terrorism-withou_b_9513034.html. 
14 Andrew J. Bacevich, “What Are U.S. Forces Doing in Yemen in the First Place?,” Atlantic, 
February 8, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/02/yemen-raid-trump/516024/; 
Richard Leiby, “U.N.: U.S. Drone Strikes Violate Pakistan Sovereignty,” Washington Post, March 15, 
2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/un-us-drones-violate-pakistan-
sovereignty/2013/03/15/308adae6-8d8a-11e2-adca-74ab31da3399_story.html; Alfred W. McCoy, “You 
Must Follow International Law (Unless You’re America),” Nation, February 24, 2015, 
https://www.thenation.com/article/you-must-follow-international-law-unless-youre-america/; Micah Zenko, 
“When the U.S. Doesn’t Respect Other Countries’ Sovereignty,” Atlantic, May 31, 2012, 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/05/when-the-us-doesnt-respect-other-countries-
sovereignty/257889/. 
15 Irregular conflict is the author’s term to describe competitions between state or non-state actors in 
which none of the actors could accurately be depicted as either combatants or violent organizations. This 
definition allows the possibility that one or more may become so if the operating environment crosses a 
violent threshold fitting the Department of Defense’s doctrinal definition of irregular warfare, which is, “A 
violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant 
population(s). Also called IW.” Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02. 
16 “ARSOF has a direct military lineage of conducting UW, which dates back more than 50 years to 
the World War II (WWII) Office of Strategic Services (OSS). The United States has conducted UW in 
support of resistance movements, insurgencies, and ongoing or pending conventional military operations. It 
has operated by, with, or through irregular forces against a variety of state and nonstate opponents. Such 
sensitive operations are a high-value component and a specific application of the military instrument of 
national power. ARSOF UW—properly employed within the context of all such power effectively 
integrated—is more relevant than ever in the 21st century international environment.” Department of the 
Army, FM 3-05.130, Army Special Operations Forces Unconventional Warfare (Washington, DC: 
Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2008). 
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and oversight required for SOF operations reduces the potential for collateral damage and 
other disadvantageous unintended results. This thesis intends to explore, and argue in the 
affirmative for, the moral utility of SOF operations as a means to prevent unnecessary loss 
of life prior to, during, and post-armed conflict scenarios.17 Contrary to the popular 
misconceptions attributed to them, this thesis argues that SOF represent an ethical 
expression of and, in fact, an expansion of military capability bound by just war theory in 
an era of increasingly irregular conflict.  
B. HOW WE GOT HERE 
After September 11, 2001, the U.S. shifted its strategy in countering terrorism from 
a reactionary to a more proactive focus.18 A little longer than a month after the attack on 
New York, U.S. Special Forces (SF) were on the ground in Afghanistan in the initial 
contact phase of what the U.S. Army calls, unconventional warfare.19 During this period, 
Green Berets infiltrated Afghanistan from neighboring countries, located factions that had 
been fighting the Taliban, formally assessed which had values compatible with U.S. foreign 
policy objectives, and provided the information to U.S. Government decision-makers.20 
Shortly thereafter, the U.S. decided to support the Northern Alliance by providing SF 
Advisors to accompany the Alliance and facilitate their offensive operations to over-throw 
the Taliban. Of course, once the U.S. began supporting offensive operations through SF 
advisors, the operation became an armed intervention. Just war theory and ethical observers 
have the framework, the lexicon, and a wide body of ethical considerations to determine 
the moral legitimacy of such an intervention.  
                                                 
17 Moral utility is the author’s term to describe the comparative advantage, specifically in terms of 
morality, using one military method versus another to achieve the desired military or political endstate.  
18 Valentina Taddeo, “U.S. Response to Terrorism: A Strategic Analysis of the Afghanistan 
Campaign,” Journal of Strategic Security 3, no. 2 (May 2010), https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.3.2.3. 
19 The Department of Defense defines unconventional warfare as, “Activities conducted to enable a 
resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by 
operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area. Also called UW. 
(JP 3-05.1)” Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02. 
20 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report : 
Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (Washington, DC: 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004). 
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While SOF, specifically SF, are proficient in special operations tasks like 
unconventional warfare, events like Afghanistan in October 2001 represent an outcome 
that is not typical of indirect tasks conducted in what the SOF community and DoD call, 
Phase Zero.21 The preponderance of SOF effort is applied globally in an effort to train, 
advise, and assist other countries to secure themselves and prevent instability. These types 
of activities and operations are designed to reinforce a nation’s ability to guarantee its own 
sovereignty, an ability which the U.S. and other Western nations believe has the best 
possibility to reduce the potential for armed conflict and to limit the scope and duration of 
armed conflict when it arises.22 
After years of well-constructed and thorough discourse on just war theory, moral 
realists and observers have fine-tuned its structure to provide an ethical boundary to 
modern armed conflict.23 The world seems to understand, albeit sometimes after a war has 
started, when and why observers should view a particular war as morally justified or 
unjustified, and further when the conduct of that war is similarly just or unjust. There are 
clearly defined examples of just wars upon which most military philosophers and ethicists 
agree. For example, the Gulf War. After Saddam Hussein invaded neighboring Kuwait in 
1991, the international community used the vernacular of just war theory to assemble a 
coalition to conduct an armed intervention to expel the Iraqi Armed Forces during 
Operation DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.24 Conversely, there are examples 
that are less clear and far more contentious, like the invasion of Iraq in 2003 during 
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.25 International actors, led by the United States, again used 
                                                 
21 Petit, Going Big by Getting Small. 
22 Clinton, “A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement,” 1994; Clinton, “A 
National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement,” 1995; Clinton, “A National Security Strategy 
of Engagement and Enlargement,” 1996; Clinton, “A National Security Strategy for a Global Age”; Bush, 
“The National Security Strategy of the United States of America”; Bush, “National Security Strategy 
2006”; Obama, Barack, “National Security Strategy,” May 2010; Obama, Barack, “National Security 
Strategy,” February 2015. 
23 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars. 
24 William V. O’Brien, “Desert Storm: A Just War Analysis,” St. John’s Law Review 66 (1992): 797; 
Michael Walzer, Michael Walzer on Just War in the Gulf War - Video, 2008, 
http://bigthink.com/videos/michael-walzer-on-just-war-in-the-gulf-war. 
25 Jeff McMahan, “Unjust War in Iraq” (Rutgers University, 2004), http://jeffersonmcmahan.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/11/Unjust-War-in-Iraq.pdf. 
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the arguments of just war theory to justify the invasion. Experts familiar with just war 
theory gave pause from the start, but after the war began and new information became 
available, observers subjected the facts to moral scrutiny and most agree that the armed 
conflict did not meet the standard conditions of just war theory.26 
While these examples provide opportunities for moral criticism before, during, and 
after armed conflict, they represent the traditional embodiment of war in the most 
conventional of senses. After all, just war theory defines the moral parameters in which 
going to war is acceptable and frames the moral obligations of conducting an ongoing war 
ethically.27 How then, do we morally evaluate competition below the level of armed 
conflict or actions conducted by SOF within either the conventional armed conflict or 
irregular conflict spectrums? This question has all too often gone unanswered.  
Ethical theories of conflict by both state and non-state actors are usually predicated 
on the assumption that the conflict by its nature is conventional, or at the very least armed. 
As such, academics, policymakers, and observers have paid significant attention to 
defining the moral parameters for ethical armed conflict. Many of these analyses assume 
that a nation is attempting to engage in a justified armed conflict executed by overt or 
conventional military forces. The moral utility derived by the application of SOF prior to, 
during, and after an armed conflict is thus given very little analysis or consideration outside 
of the United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM).  
                                                 
26 McMahan. I will not rehash the full arguments for or against the justification conclusions of either 
of these wars; doing so would exceed the scope of this thesis. I raise them, rather, to demonstrate two 
recent cases of armed conflict involving the U.S. about which most just war theorists analyze using the 
standards of just war theory yet come to starkly different conclusions. 
27 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars; Walzer, Arguing about War; Jenkins, Robillard, and Strawser, Who 
Should Die? The Ethics of Killing in War. 
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Just war theory, its recent revisions, and other ethical models identify when and 
how a state or non-state entity can enter and execute justified armed conflict.28 By framing 
these principles against the applicable core tasks and capabilities of SOF, it is possible to 
illuminate key deductions about the application of SOF in conventional warfare. Further, 
if we apply some of these principles to irregular conflict and especially to Phase Zero 
operations, we may be able to sufficiently frame pre-conflict influence operations and 
begin to describe the ethics that bound such actions.29 Of course, this framing could lead 
to a preliminary determination on whether or not these types of SOF employment are 
morally permissible. If so, we may then begin a meaningful discussion on how such SOF 
operations might fall within the permissible spectrum and how Phase Zero strategies might 
be operationalized to increase their moral utility. 
An ethical model or theory that provides a lexicon for further discussion on SOF 
employment prior to, during, and after war might provide valuable insights, especially 
when viewed from a policy perspective. Current United States Code, specifically Titles 10 
and 22, creates a tangled web of authority that inhibits the effective application of SOF 
prior to armed conflict. United States Code does not clearly grant primacy to either the 
DoD or the Department of State (DOS). If, however, it can be shown that the application 
of SOF does indeed preserve flexibility, increase moral utility, and has the potential to 
prevent armed conflict from even occurring, then United States Code and policy could be 
written to promote and accommodate the more efficient use of the irregular capability 
provided by SOF.  
                                                 
28 In the current just war theory landscape, the traditional “orthodox” view is represented by Walzer, 
while the likes of McMahan and Rodin, noted above, are the flagbearers for the revisionist school of just 
war theory. More recently, in response to the flood of revisionist work, we’ve seen both some defenses of 
the Walzerian traditional view (see Yitzhak Benbaji, “The War Convention and the Moral Division of 
Labour,” Philosophical Quarterly 59, no. 237 (September 22, 2009): 593–617, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.577.x.. and Michael Skerker, The Moral Status of Combatants 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, Forthcoming). Additionally, some have pushed for a tertium quid 
approach to the binary traditional/revisionist dichotomy. See, for example, Seumas Miller, Shooting to Kill: 
The Ethics of Police and Military Use of Lethal Force, 2016. Across all such approaches to just war theory, 
however, the point remains: clear principles are articulated against which various military operations can 
then be judged, including SOF capabilities.   
29 The U.S. DoD defines phase zero as, “Shape (Phase 0). Joint and multinational operations—
inclusive of normal and routine military activities—and various interagency activities are performed to 
dissuade or deter potential adversaries and to assure or solidify relationships with friends and allies.” Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0. 
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C. IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM 
Just war theory describes when armed conflict is justifiable and defines the 
considerations for the moral conduct of warfare. Given popular misconceptions, moral 
realists of our time have not yet juxtaposed the application of SOF in irregular conflict with 
just war theory and its contemporary revisions. An analysis of SOF operations within the 
context of just war theory is required to determine whether there is a particular moral utility 
to the employment of SOF.  
If such a determination exists, decision and policymakers, their staffs, analysts, and 
observers may then possess a more accurate picture of flexible deterrent or response 
options short of armed intervention.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This thesis is predicated upon three main disciplines of academic thought: 
philosophy, political science, and military science. The core of research consists of 
fundamental principles from just war theory, its recent revisionist strains, policy analysis, 
and military doctrine. Just war theory and its contemporary revisions form the conceptual 
framework through which to analyze the application of SOF. Military frameworks 
supported by doctrine will augment research on just war theory to illuminate similarities 
and dissimilarities in the conceptual nature of irregular conflict. Comparative politics and 
military science form the experiential elements of the study. Reviewing case studies of the 
application of SOF through a comparative method will highlight key successes and failures 
with respect to conventional and non-conventional military operations and their effects on 
the domestic polities and political institutions of a country in conflict.  
Just war theory traditionally encompasses two main criteria: the justifications for 
going to war—jus ad bellum—and the just conduct of war—jus in bello.30 The essential 
                                                 
30 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars. More recently, the just war theory canon has been further expanded 
to include conceptual terrain such as just conduct after war (jus post bellum) and just terms for when to end 
a war (jus ex bello). On the former, see Brian Orend, “Jus Post Bellum,” Journal of Social Philosophy 31, 
no. 1 (2000): 117–137; Brian Orend, The Morality of War (Peterborough, Ont., 2006).  On the later, see the 
seminal work by Darrel Moellendorf, “Jus Ex Bello,” Journal of Political Philosophy 16, no. 2 (June 
2008): 123–36, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9760.2008.00310.x. 
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concepts of jus ad bellum relevant to the application of SOF are the legalist paradigm, 
prevention, and preemption. These principles in traditional just war theory, as well as 
contemporary revisionist approaches, are predicated on the assumption of a conventional 
armed conflict or major operation following a satisfactory justification.31 Unfortunately, 
just war theory does not specifically identify conditions in which the application of SOF, 
specifically in Phase Zero of the continuum of conflict, are morally permissible.32  
Jus in bello, or justice in war, represents the body of just war theory that specifies 
the parameters for ethical conduct within warfare.33 The self-imposed restraints described 
by jus in bello are based on the twin principles of proportionality and distinction.34 
Proportionality demands that the good gained by any given military attack must be 
proportionate to the harm done by that attack, while distinction requires that only 
combatants are intentionally targeted in warfare.35 The idea of proportionality applies to 
all forces in a given conflict, but again, there are few examples in relevant literature that 
explore the application of SOF within this framework. Specifically, the idea of 
proportionality has not been applied to irregular conflict in phase zero and phase one 
executed by SOF. Contemporary revisionist approaches of just war theory that focus on 
concepts of individual responsibility speak indirectly to the use of SOF in operations prior 
                                                 
31 The Department of Defense defines a major operation in Joint Publication 1-02 as, “A series of 
tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by combat forces of a single or several Services, 
coordinated in time and place, to achieve strategic or operational objectives in an operational area.” 
Historically, the term for a major military engagement using combat forces was called high-intensity 
conflict, then full-spectrum operations, followed by major combat operations, and now major operations. 
The new term encompasses irregular and conventional warfare actions. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint 
Publication 1-02. 
32 Department of Defense defines phase zero (shape) in Joint Publication 5-0 as, “Joint and 
multinational operations— inclusive of normal and routine military activities—and various interagency 
activities are performed to dissuade or deter potential adversaries and to assure or solidify relationships 
with friends and allies.” And phase one (deter) as, “The intent of this phase is to deter undesirable 
adversary action by demonstrating the capabilities and resolve of the joint force. It includes activities to 
prepare forces and set conditions for deployment and employment of forces in the event that deterrence is 
not successful.” Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0. 
33 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars. 
34 Walzer. 
35 The principle of military necessity is a corollary that often falls out of the proportionality constraint; 
while noncombatant immunity is the proper extension of distinction. 
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to armed conflict or during any phase of irregular conflict, and will be explored within 
this thesis.36 
United States Code has three distinct titles that form the foundation of the legal 
basis of our interaction with other nations during peacetime and war. Title 10 outlines the 
authorities of the DoD, Title 22 the authorities of the DOS, and Title 50 the authorities in 
war and national defense.37 The legal authorities established by these titles form a tangled 
web of responsibility prior to, during, and after an armed conflict. The application of SOF 
in support of the proponents of these titles has been addressed in literature, but not treated 
sufficiently with respect to the preservation of moral utility and the inherent flexibility 
these applications can cultivate.  
SOF doctrine and employment in irregular conflict intrinsically limit the scope of 
conflict between state and non-state competitors. Irregular conflict typically occurs within 
Phase Zero of the continuum of conflict.38 Military doctrine and SOF operating principles 
speak indirectly to jus ad bellum in this respect, but the moral conclusions that should be 
drawn from jus in bello for these types of military employments have not been sufficiently 
addressed. The application of SOF in Phase Zero employs small formations that may 
produce outsized strategic effects with comparatively few military resources.39 Further, 
analyses of SOF employment in Phases Three through Five of conventional warfare have 
not distinguished between the collateral damages caused by large combat formations’ units 
of action as opposed to those caused by SOF units of action.40 
                                                 
36 McMahan, Killing in War. 
37 “U.S. Code: Title 10 - Department of Defense,” 101–2926 § (1956), 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10; “U.S. Code: Title 22 -Foreign Relations and Intercourse,” 22, 
accessed August 7, 2017, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/22; “U.S. Code: Title 50 - War and 
National Defense,” 50, accessed August 7, 2017, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50. 
38 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02; Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0. 
39 Petit, Going Big by Getting Small. 
40 An example of a U.S. Army conventional unit of action is a brigade combat team (BCT) which 
encompasses around 4500-7000 Soldiers. Conversely, a U.S. Army Special Operations Command unit of 
action is a Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha (SFODA) which is normally twelve Green 
Berets.  
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The next chapter discusses in some detail how SOF support objectives during 
armed conflict. Specifically, the chapter directly speaks to how SOF achieve morally 
beneficial effects during phases of the continuum of conflict that should be considered 
large-scale combat operations or major campaigns. The discussion focuses on traditional 
and revisionist just war logic to demonstrate that large-scale combat forces realize 
significant moral improvements when SOF precision and nuance are applied in support of 
objectives during armed conflict.  
Chapter III illuminates critical shortcomings in just war theory when applied to 
activities below the level of armed conflict—ultimately arguing for an expansion to the 
theory itself. Principally, the chapter addresses the need for clarity and understanding of 
how SOF interaction short of overt warfare can produce Phase Zero results that limit the 
scope of violence and preclude subsequent phases of conflict. The chapter also establishes 
that competition below the level of armed conflict can be morally justified and that it is 
furthermore subject to moral criticism. Additionally, it articulates several initial 
considerations for the moral framing of SOF applied below the level of armed conflict and 
proposes expansions to just war theory to encapsulate irregular conflict in Phase Zero.  
In Chapter IV, this thesis examines Russia’s involvement in Crimea and Eastern 
Ukraine through the perspective of the proposed just war theory expansion. The aim is to 
highlight key deductions based on the application of several of the principles offered in 
Chapter III. The chapter demonstrates just war theory’s inadequacy in framing Russia’s 
activities below the level of armed conflict while juxtaposing its efficacy after the transition 
from Phase Zero to armed conflict in Phase Two. This chapter also reveals the possibility 
of several implications on jus ad bellum and jus in bello considerations that arise from the 
proposed expansion. Specifically, it discusses potential SOF applications that could have 
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II. SOF IN SUPPORT OF OBJECTIVES DURING ARMED 
CONFLICT 
This chapter discusses the application of just war thinking to the phases in the 
continuum of conflict that include armed conflict. From this perspective, it offers a glimpse 
of the moral implication of SOF’s unique extension of the ethical principles established in 
just war theory that can limit the unnecessary loss of life during and after large-scale 
combat operations and major campaigns. When the traditional elements of jus ad bellum 
are met, it could be challenging to argue that there is (or has existed) a more moral war-
fighting force than the contemporary U.S. military. It is evident by the DoD’s updating and 
crafting of the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), better known by its most debated section—
the Rules of Engagement (ROE)—the DoD, and most of the U.S. Government, have whole-
heartedly embraced just war theory vis-à-vis the widespread adoption of the principles of 
jus ad bellum in decisions to go to war and the jus in bello principles of proportionality and 
distinction in its waging of war.41 Additionally, the use of precision guided munitions 
(PGMs), new technologies, and updated targeting doctrine have resulted in more accurate 
and precise conventional military operations. The combined result is some of the lowest 
rates of casualties and collateral damages resulting from warfare in human history.42 These 
advances all share a similar organizing principle: the goal of killing only those who meet 
the conditions for classification as a combatant and preserving the life of innocents.  
Yet, warfighting remains a messy business that results in human casualties, 
regardless of advanced capabilities. While unnecessary human casualties have been more 
limited in contemporary U.S. warfare, they have yet to be completely eradicated.43 
Nonetheless, during modern large-scale combat operations in which two military powers 
engage each other conventionally, the overall human loss has been minimized to an 
                                                 
41 Department of Defense, Law of War Manual. 
42 Joshua S. Goldstein, “Think Again: War,” Foreign Policy (blog), August 15, 2011, 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/08/15/think-again-war/; PRIO, “Data on Armed Conflict,” accessed August 
30, 2017, https://www.prio.org/Data/Armed-Conflict/?id=348. 
43 Goldstein, “Think Again”; PRIO, “Data on Armed Conflict.” 
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unprecedented low.44 The modern U.S. military has been able to identify, target, and 
neutralize traditional military threats quickly and efficiently without a large potential for 
additional damage occurring. In that regard, traditional just war theory’s jus in bello 
principles provide clear ethical evaluation criteria for the engagement of military targets in 
conventional military operations.    
Irregular warfare, however, offers a more difficult challenge to both jus in bello 
criteria and the measurement of human casualties. PGMs and other advanced capabilities 
help to reduce negative second and third order effects, but the civilian casualty rate likely 
reamins higher in irregular warfare than that of traditional military operations. 
Contemporary revisionist just war theorists have expanded the moral boundaries of 
traditional just war principles along several angles. This new approach to the moral thought 
of just war theory may provide a better framework for the conduct of irregular warfare 
operations like counterinsurgency (COIN).45 However, COIN is difficult and complex for 
many reasons, one of which is the challenge of identifying friend from foe in the absence 
of conventions of identification that are neither recognized nor implemented by insurgents.  
Revisionist just war thought has advanced the idea of individual liability as central 
to the ethics of war in determining who should rightfully be killed in combat.46 As a result, 
individual actors in war, and their individual rights and legitimate claims on others, weigh 
heavily in contemporary debates over who should legitimately be targeted in war and other 
jus in bello practices.47 Many critics regard this revisionist conceptual framework as too 
restrictive to effectively fight a war, preferring instead to maintain the traditional view on 
                                                 
44 Goldstein, “Think Again”; PRIO, “Data on Armed Conflict.” 
45 The U.S. DoD Defines counterinsurgency in Joint Publication 1-02 as, “Comprehensive civilian and 
military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes. Also 
called COIN. (JP 3-24).” Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02. 
46 See McMahan, Killing in War. Also see the litany of follow on work: Seth Lazar, “The 
Responsibility Dilemma for Killing in War: A Review Essay,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 38, no. 2 
(2010): 180–213; Jenkins, Robillard, and Strawser, Who Should Die? The Ethics of Killing in War; Helen 
Frowe, Defensive Killing: An Essay on War and Self-Defence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); 
Helen Frowe and Gerald Lang, How We Fight: Ethics in War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
among many others.  
47 See, for example, Jenkins, Robillard, and Strawser, Who Should Die? The Ethics of Killing in 
War.Which explores this question extensively by a range of recent revisionist scholars.  
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who can rightly be intentionally killed in warfare.48 On the traditional, Walzerian view, a 
simple division between combatant and noncombatant grounded on the mutual posing of a 
threat forms the basis for justified jus in bello actions. Revisionists counter, however, that 
merely posing a threat cannot be sufficient grounds for being a liable target, as has long 
been held in just war theory, for there are many in war, and outside of war, who pose a 
morally justified threat. As such, those posing a morally justified threat have thus done 
nothing to surrender their right to not be killed, and should not be morally liable to be killed 
in war. Indeed, this question of idea individual liability has found its way to the center of 
the present just war theory debate.49 The question of who should die is an important one—
but it is a question that, militarily speaking, can be even more difficult to answer than 
philosophically. In other words, even if we were to have a widely accepted moral 
framework it would add such a degree of effort to military operations that could result in a 
strong potential to reduce the overall efficiency of the effort and thus unnecessarily prolong 
the war.  
Despite the difficulties posed by irregular warfare, the U.S. military does an 
admirable job, by way of the LOAC and ROE, in attempting to lower the levels of collateral 
damage and civilian casualties. In addition to using administrative solutions like the ROE 
and policies, the U.S. military updated its operating doctrine to achieve more precise 
targeting procedures that refine the process to increase the accuracy of strikes and other 
offensive operations.50 Specifically, SOF have made significant contributions to the 
targeting process, particularly through COIN operations in Afghanistan—which have 
brought its operations into closer alignment with the revisionist just war theory framework 
and provided insight into the realm of what is actually possible in future conflicts.  
                                                 
48 Seth Lazar argues that the revisionist approach is too restrictive, thereby rendering just warfare 
impossible.  Lazar, however, agrees with the main lines of criticism that revisionists press against 
traditional just war theory. See Lazar, “The Responsibility Dilemma for Killing in War.” For examples of 
those who argue for a return to the simple, traditional binary approach to targeting, see Benbaji, “The War 
Convention and the Moral Division of Labour.” Also see Michael Skerker, The Moral Status of 
Combatants (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Forthcoming). 
49 Jenkins, Robillard, and Strawser, Who Should Die? The Ethics of Killing in War. 
50 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-60, Joint Targeting, 1st ed. (Suffolk, VA: United States 
Department of Defense, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Doctrine 
Group, 2013). 
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A. LARGE-SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS 
Whether regular or irregular in nature, conventional military forces deployed to 
conduct large-scale combat operations will likely increase their moral utility by employing 
SOF. In many respects, militaries may well choose to increase their moral utility for realist 
or pragmatic utilitarian reasons, as opposed to purely principled reasons. Regardless, in the 
contemporary operating environment, there is a reasonable expectation that future 
warfighting will be more irregular in nature.51 With respect to large-scale combat 
operations, the combined presence of increased globalization, international media, and the 
prevalence of cellular hand-held media devices amplifies the negative utilitarian 
consequences of acting immorally. In other words, organizational military ethics may often 
not be based on pure, altruistic moral reasons.52 Rather, a desire to accomplish the mission 
and win the war may drive these ethical principles, and specifically, those moral concerns 
emphasized by revisionist just war theory, into a de facto synchronization with military 
operations in an effort to best guarantee success.53 
The joint operational phasing of warfare describes six different phases within the 
continuum of conflict.54 According to the model, if the U.S. fails to influence in Phase 
Zero or to deter in Phase One—then we are faced with the potential of large-scale combat 
operations in the beginning of Phase Two. Assuming that options other than war have 
failed, and that the armed conflict meets the moral requirements of traditional or revisionist 
just war theory, and, further, that the war will be fought using large-scale combat forces, 
then it becomes possible to morally assess the employment of SOF in support of 
conventional objectives through the phases of the continuum of conflict. 
                                                 
51 Robert A. Johnson, “Predicting Future War,” Australian Defence Force Journal, no. 196 (2015): 70. 
52 Jonathan D. Kingsley, “Special Forces Values: How the Regiment’s Ethical Framework Influences Its 
Organizational Effectiveness” (Naval Postgraduate School, 2017). 
53 Kingsley. 
54 See Figure 1, Notional Operation Plan Phases overlaid on the Continuum of Conflict. 
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1. Phase Two: Seize the Initiative 
When the conventional military is ordered to mobilize and deploy to an armed 
conflict, there are many planning considerations and factors that are analyzed prior to the 
execution of actual combat operations.55 Updating facts and assumptions is critical during 
the pre-deployment planning and preparations. In an ideal Phase Two situation, a 
conventional invasion force would know what ports to use, where critical adversary 
defensive systems are located, and the disposition of the adversary’s main combat forces. 
This type of information would be used to determine appropriate risk levels and which 
critical adversary defenses should be neutralized or avoided altogether. By accurately 
determining these factors, a military is able to properly target adversarial military targets, 
as well as correctly apply the doctrine of double effect prior to the introduction of a major 
operation or campaign.  
SOF excel in facilitating a comprehensive understanding of the environment in 
which operations are planned to occur. Returning to the Allied landings in Normandy, 
noted in Chapter I, envision modern SOF and how they might have enabled such an 
operation. Perhaps Navy Sea, Air, and Land Teams (SEALs) might have conducted special 
reconnaissance (SR) to determine which ways ashore were suitable for landing craft and 
determine which sections of beachhead were the least defended.56 Also, Army SF might 
have conducted SR behind enemy lines in France to determine where main Nazi defensive 
systems and forces were located as well as their capability to counter-attack potential 
invasion points. Army Special Operations Civil Affairs (CA) likely would have conducted 
civil reconnaissance to determine if there were any civilian capabilities that could be 
temporarily-disabled to provide an advantage to Allied forces, tasks the OSS actually 
                                                 
55 These considerations and factors are captured in several joint and service-branch specific planning 
processes. These military planning processes are codified in joint and service-branch specific doctrine and 
taught at mandatory military training and education courses. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0; 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0. 
56 The U.S. DoD defines special reconnaissance in Joint Publication 1-02 as, “Reconnaissance and 
surveillance actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or diplomatically and/or politically 
sensitive environments to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance, employing 
military capabilities not normally found in conventional forces. Also called SR. (JP 3-05).” Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, Joint Publication 1-02. 
 20 
performed.57 For example, locate all the phone lines in and out of Erwin Rommel’s 
headquarters and cut them to reduce the defender’s ability to communicate with his 
subordinate forces. Army Psychological Operations (PSYOP) likely would have created a 
desired perception using disinformation or a military deception (MILDEC) campaign to 
convince the Germans that the invading force might be heading to a different beach.58 Air 
Force SOF (AFSOF) probably would have been responsible for controlling close air 
support (CAS) and personnel recovery (PR) operations.59  
Examining the employment of SOF from this perspective, it is clear that without 
these types of capabilities prior to and during Phase Two, we should not expect to approach 
compliance with the strict ethical demands that a revisionist view of jus in bello entails. 
Taking the described scenario provided from 1944 to the current operating environment, 
we might also infer a much lower tolerance for collateral damage than would have existed 
in 1944. Although the OSS did achieve operations similar to the hypotheticals described, 
today’s SOF are more precise and nuanced in their ability set favorable conditions for 
success while reducing both combatant and non-combatant casualties.  
                                                 
57 S. J. Lewis, Jedburgh Team Operations in Support of the 12th Army Group, August 1944 (Fort 
Leavenworth, Kan.: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1991), 
https://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/lewis.pdf. 
58 This obviously occurred when the Allies used an inflatable division to convince the Germans of an 
imminent invasion at Pas d’Calais. Although at the time PYSOP was not a branch in the military—which 
the same is true of AFSOF, CA, SEALs, and SF. The U.S. DoD defines desired perception in Joint 
Publication 1-02 as, “In military deception, what the deception target must believe for it to make the 
decision that will achieve the deception objective. (JP 3-13.4)” Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02. 
The U.S. DoD defines military deception in Joint Publication 1-02 as, “Actions executed to deliberately 
mislead adversary military, paramilitary, or violent extremist organization decision makers, thereby causing 
the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the 
friendly mission. Also called MILDEC. (JP 3-13.4)” Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
59 The U.S. DoD defines close air support in Joint Publication 1-02 as, “Air action by fixed- and 
rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces and that require 
detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces. Also called CAS. See 
also air interdiction. (JP 3-0)” Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02. The U.S. DoD defines 
personnel recovery in Joint Publication 1-02 as,” The sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to 
prepare for and execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel. Also called PR. See also 
combat search and rescue; evasion; personnel; recovery; search and rescue. (JP 3-50)” Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
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2. Phase Three: Dominate 
During Phase Three of the continuum of conflict, large-scale combat forces seek to 
overwhelm the adversary and force capitulation or some other negotiated outcome.60 In 
conventional warfare, this requires intelligence to drive major operations as well as 
precision operations to degrade essential adversary capabilities and infrastructure.61 In 
short, this is the phase of the war in which the targeted adversarial military forces sustain 
engagement, are reduced, and finally defeated.  
When conventional military forces are faced with an insurgency-based adversary, 
targeting becomes more complex and requires increased precision. SOF bring a nuanced 
capability that facilitates effectiveness and compliments the capabilities the conventional 
military brings to bear to overwhelm and reduce enemy forces. When interoperating during 
large-scale combat operations, the military describes the complimentary effects as an 
interdependence between SOF and conventional forces.62 SOF achieve their contributions 
supporting conventional military objectives by working through indigenous people and 
organizations as well as conducting precision targeting operations.63 SOF use much 
smaller footprints to conduct SR and DA operations that contribute to the success in 
identifying complete threat networks, thereby allowing conventional military battle-space 
owners to make decisions with comprehensive targeting information. 
Whether U.S. decision makers elect to deploy conventional military forces for 
conventional or irregular large-scale combat operations, they will likely benefit from 
comprehensive targeting information. This decreases the likelihood of unintended 
                                                 
60 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0; Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0. 
61 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-60, 3–6; United States Army Special Operations 
Command, “USASOC 2035: Communicating the ARSOF Narrative and Setting the Course to 2035,” April 
2017, 201983-000; United States Army Special Operations Command, “ARSOF 2022,” Special Warfare, 
no. Special Edition (May 2014): 32; United States Army Special Operations Command, “ARSOF 2022 Part 
2,” Special Warfare, no. Special Edition (August 2014): 32. 
62 United States Army Special Operations Command, “ARSOF 2022”; United States Army Special 
Operations Command, “ARSOF 2022 Part 2.” 
63 United States Army Special Operations Command, “USASOC Strategy 2035.” 
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consequences that might harm innocents or result in collateral damage that would be 
counterproductive to victory or a lasting peace.  
3. Phase Four: Stabilize 
During the fourth phase of the continuum, military forces seek to move away from 
sustained combat operations and begin stability operations.64 Stabilization may be the most 
difficult phase in the continuum of conflict. Given the resources and time required it is 
challenging even when it is executed correctly,  and whether knowingly or unknowingly—
criticisms of the U.S. approach to Afghanistan and Iraq appear to center on the military’s 
ability to successfully conduct this phase.65 This phase should be viewed as the point in 
time during a conflict when the adversary is mostly defeated, a generally safe environment 
exists, essential host-nation government services are restored, and external humanitarian 
relief begins.66 
The conventional military excels at large-scale operations in general, but there are 
few organizations that have the capability to match the sheer magnitude of humanitarian 
supplies the conventional military is able to provide. This phase, however, requires more 
than supplies and large-scale capabilities—it also requires specific attention to host-nation 
governmental and security force structures. The conventional military has the capacity to 
address some of these concerns, and routinely does—but through ad-hoc solutions like 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). SOF contributes to operational success in this 
phase by conducting security-force assistance (SFA), humanitarian and civic assistance, 
and support to public diplomacy.67 These tasks partly comprise, or are constituent elements 
of, SOCOM’s list of core activities, meaning that SOF conduct specific military 
                                                 
64 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0. 
65 Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis and Joint Staff J7, “Decade of War, Volume I: Enduring 
Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations,” Military Governmental (Washington D.C.: JCOA, June 15, 
2012); R. Jeffrey Smith, “U.S. Military Admits Major Mistakes in Iraq and Afghanistan,” Atlantic, June 11, 
2012, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/06/us-military-admits-major-mistakes-in-
iraq-and-afghanistan/258339/. 
66 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0. 
67 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations (Suffolk, VA: United States 
Department of Defense, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Doctrine 
Group, 2014), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_13.pdf. 
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occupational specialty (MOS) training to validate their proficiency and ability to 
successfully execute these types of host nation government support operations.68 
Given the recent discussion and criticism of large-scale stabilization activities in 
Afghanistan, it would seem that options more limited in scope may be desirable.69 
Specifically, with regard to the case of Afghanistan, considerations of when it is morally 
justified to exit a war, a set of principles recently elucidated as jus ex bello—it might be 
considered immoral to cut our losses and leave.70 Although many might consider stability 
operations in Afghanistan a mistake, the moral question for the military force already in 
Phase Four is how to maximize good and prevent harm in the form of collateral damage 
and civilian casualties. Viewing the application of SOF from this perspective, it seems wise 
to make use of SOF’s indigenous approach, precision targeting, and ability to understand 
and influence the environment. Even if simply for utilitarian reasons such as efficient war 
prosecution and victory—SOF application has the potential to bring operations into closer 
alignment with the moral demands of the revisionist jus in bello framework.71 
4. Phase Five: Enable Civil Authority 
The fifth phase of the continuum usually begins when, or shortly after, the military 
endstate is achieved. During this period, the large-scale combat forces will likely be re-
deploying from the major operation or campaign as the joint force provides support to the 
legitimate civil government authorities in the host nation. Also during this phase, the joint 
                                                 
68 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-05, Special Operations (Suffolk, VA: United States 
Department of Defense, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Doctrine 
Group, 2014). 
69 Smith, “U.S. Military Admits Major Mistakes in Iraq and Afghanistan.” 
70 Robert Mackey, “‘Just War’ Theory and Afghanistan,” The Lede (blog), December 10, 2009, 
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operation ends and transitions host-nation support activities conducted by U.S. Forces to 
the Geographic Combatant Command (GCC).72 
With large-scale combat forces seeing the end of the joint and combined operation, 
the focus transitions from U.S. Forces leading operations and enabling host nation security 
forces to host nation government structures and their security apparatuses. Conventional 
military forces might be stationed permanently in the post-conflict nation if the U.S. and 
host nation sign a status of forces agreement (SOFA) in which the host nation agrees to the 
extended presence of U.S. Forces. The SOFA was the basis of extended troop deployments 
in post-World War II Europe, and it continues to be true of U.S. Forces stationed in 
Germany today. However, in most cases, the U.S. will not leave large-scale combat forces 
for extended periods in the host nation.  
As the large-scale combat forces re-deploy, conventional and SOF CA, PSYOP, 
and SF will continue to increase governmental capacity in the host nation through their 
indigenous approach to mentorship programs—executing what is known as a foreign 
internal defense (FID).73 FID is another SOCOM core-activity executed by SOF who are 
formally assessed, specially selected, trained, and validated in their ability to successfully 
conduct this type of operation. When conventional forces employ SOF in this manner, the 
DoD and U.S. Government stand on firm moral ground. The indigenous approach executed 
by SOF, in both Phase Five and ultimately the return to Phase Zero, is based on the 
invitation and request for training and support from the host nation as expressed within a 
SOFA.  
Whether the nation decides to sign a SOFA is their choice as a sovereign nation. 
This process allows the potential partner nation to exercise sovereignty with the finality 
they are morally entitled to as a collective representation of their people’s rights.74 If the 
nation decides to sign a SOFA or request support, then there is no morally illegitimate 
                                                 
  72 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0; Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0. 
73 United States Army Special Operations Command, “USASOC 2035.” 
74 It is important to note that this notion is an essential element of the legalist paradigm which is a 
traditional component of just war thinking. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars; Dubik, Just War Reconsidered. 
among many others.  
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element to the presence of U.S. SOF in the host nation. When the SOFA is signed or not 
signed, the continuum returns to Phase Zero and normal diplomatic relations can resume.  
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III. SOF IN SUPPORT OF OBJECTIVES BELOW THE LEVEL OF 
ARMED CONFLICT 
The previous chapter established that SOF employment in support of objectives in 
armed conflict represents an evolution of just war thinking—particularly when dealing with 
irregular warfare. Knowing how SOF provide precise support to traditional military 
objectives is critical to understanding how asymmetric warfare executed by conventional 
forces might achieve more successful outcomes with continued support from SOF. What 
if, however, we might avoid or prevent an extremely difficult and resource intensive large-
scale combat operation in the first place? Are we able to achieve successful national policy 
outcomes short of overt warfare? This chapter argues that it is necessary to expand just war 
theory to encompass competition below the level of armed conflict—Phase Zero. Since 
Phase Zero occurs below the level of armed conflict, the expansion results in two proposed 
developments aimed at providing a framework to evaluate when and how SOF employment 
below the threshold of armed conflict is morally permissible. Put differently, the 
application of SOF in competition below the level of armed conflict, as in Phase Zero and 
Phase One, has the potential to better enable the U.S. whole of government approach during 
peacetime intergovernmental relations and in spaces where state or non-state actors 
compete for influence. Based on previous National Security Strategy (NSS) documents 
since the Clinton administration, it seems that we believe that, at least in a general sense, 
engagement will produce a more stable international environment where armed conflict is 
less likely.75 As identified in Chapter I, Figure 1, Notional Operation Plan Phases overlaid 
on the Continuum of Conflict, military doctrine describes engagement outside of traditional 
armed conflict to occur in Phase Zero and Phase One.76  
                                                 
75 Clinton, “A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement,” 1994; Clinton, “A 
National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement,” 1995; Clinton, “A National Security Strategy 
of Engagement and Enlargement,” 1996; Clinton, “A National Security Strategy for a Global Age”; Bush, 
“The National Security Strategy of the United States of America”; Bush, “National Security Strategy 
2006”; Obama, Barack, “National Security Strategy,” May 2010; Obama, Barack, “National Security 
Strategy,” February 2015. 
76 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0; Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5-0. 
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State and non-state actors routinely compete for influence within relevant spheres 
to facilitate their foreign policy objectives.77 The U.S. Government relies on the DOS to 
integrate efforts in normalized diplomatic relations, which the DoD defines as Phase 
Zero.78 Although the U.S. Government also relies on the DOS to integrate efforts in 
competitive influence scenarios, we must question what organizational capability the DOS 
possesses to achieve success in this venue. The DOS is well-equipped to maintain the 
status-quo in most situations, but the DoD—in particular, SOF, has some of the greatest 
capability to advise and assist Allied or Partnered Nations in building security-force 
capacity and to attribute state-on-state aggression or political warfare. Make no mistake, 
the argument here is not that the DoD should, nor could it for that matter, supplant the DOS 
in managing relations with other nations. It is rather, that the U.S. Government—
specifically DOS, should invest more heavily in competition below the level of armed 
conflict conducted by SOF in Phase Zero for both practical and moral reasons.  
A. PRACTICAL REASONS FOR SOF IN PHASE ZERO 
The chief practical reason for pursuing Phase Zero is avoiding the cost of major 
combat operations. Avoiding war saves blood, treasure, and ultimately exposes the U.S. to 
less risk of protracted entanglements that carry open-ended and usually long-term 
commitments. Contemporary authors like Joseph Nye, Jr., have espoused the efficiencies 
to be gained by incorporating soft power into our foreign policy approach.79 
What actions are SOF capable of executing in Phase Zero that might facilitate the 
maintenance of more peaceful inter-state interaction, or at least serve to bound the potential 
for major combat operations vis-à-vis armed conflict? Perhaps more importantly, what 
actions should SOF be allowed to undertake in support of this objective and how should 
they go about doing it? From a practical perspective, SOF bring precise and nuanced 
                                                 
77 United States Army, United States Army, and United States Marine Corps, “Multi-Domain Battle: 
Evolution of Combined Arms for the 21st Century 2025-2040.” 
78 “U.S. Code: Title 22 -Foreign Relations and Intercourse,” accessed August 7, 2017, 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/22. 
79 Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics; Joseph Nye, “The Future of Power,” 
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capabilities that are designed to produce stability when used within the steady-state Phase 
Zero environment. SOF achieve these through the execution of core activities, which are 
the essential tasks SOF are specially selected, manned, trained, and equipped to produce 
successful outcomes in across the continuum of conflict.80 See Figure 2. Special 
Operations Core Activities as Listed in Joint Publication 3–05. SOF core activities can 
produce noteworthy results that enable the U.S. whole of government in Phase Zero even 
when the presence of a competitive influence does not exist and remains especially true in 
the case that DOS Country Teams assess that a competitive influence is present. In fact, 
the U.S. Army and Marine Corps are nearing completion on their jointly developed 
operating concept that describes multi-domain battle and further details the competition 
occurring below the level of armed conflict.81  
As John Arquilla suggests in “The (B)end of History” the intersection of networks’ 
influence on peace, conflict, and state actors’ sovereignty has the potential to cause 
protracted conflict—perhaps most likely below the level of armed conflict.82 Arquilla also 
concludes that these non-state and state actors can coexist.83 Fussell and Lee determine 
that in order for state actors to remain adaptive and agile against networked threats they 
must reconfigure organizations’ internal networks and increase collective awareness.84 If 
this is true, then there is an opportunity, perhaps most notably so in SOF’s capability to 
increase combined Ally and Partner state-actors’ internal networks while simultaneously 
increasing their combined awareness and capacity to act.  
                                                 
80 Descriptions of the SOF core activities are listed in detail in Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 
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81 United States Army, United States Army, and United States Marine Corps, “Multi-Domain Battle: 
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Figure 2.  Special Operations Core Activities as Listed in 
Joint Publication 3–0585 
1. SOF Paradigms and Capabilities 
Successful strategic outcomes rarely occur overnight. They should be viewed as 
iterative processes that occur over long-term time horizons. In the SOF community, this is 
colloquially referred to as the long view. The long view is challenging for many reasons, 
not least among them the forces generation cycle and the relatively short strategic cycles 
that the DoD runs on with respect to a (generally true) two-year command tenure. In other 
words, military commanders routinely change about every two years. When commanders 
change, organizational priorities and visions tend to change as well. For many military 
objectives, this can be a great benefit. When it comes to Phase Zero, this can add a 
challenging element to a successful outcome with respect to long term regional goals and 
                                                 
85 Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-05. 
 31 
priorities. SOF do not have a longer command tenure, nor do they synchronize efforts better 
than the traditional cycle—they just do it differently.86   
The key difference in the approach is simply that SOF are organized to train other 
nations’ security forces and build their capacity to secure their own nations.87 SOF also 
provide training to operationalize a host-nation government’s strategy assigned to their 
security forces, this type of training and synthesis results in critical feedback to DOS 
foreign affairs and diplomatic missions abroad as well as the GCCs that help to frame their 
strategies to support stability. U.S. ASOC describes its Army Special Operations Forces’ 
(ARSOF) capabilities in four pillars, the indigenous approach, precision targeting, 
understand & influence, and crisis response.88 Considering the characteristics of 
competition below the level of armed conflict, all four of these pillars contribute—either 
directly or indirectly, to the capability to make meaningful contributions to successful 
outcomes during Phase Zero.89 Thinking about the comprehensive nature possible when 
combining direct and indirect methods in Phase Zero, the result is the adaptability and 
flexibility to remain balanced and agile to meet conditions subject to either emergent or 
persistent challenges.90 
                                                 
86 Petit, Going Big by Getting Small: The Application of Operational Art by Special Operations in 
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87 Petit. 
88 United States Army Special Operations Command, “USASOC 2035”; United States Army Special 
Operations Command, “USASOC Strategy 2035.” 
89 The use of direct and indirect refers to the U.S. DoD’s outlining of the direct and indirect 
approaches in Joint Publication 3-05. The U.S. DoD defines the direct approach as, “A direct approach may 
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2. Strategic Utility of Phase Zero  
The diffusion of global power structures and technology has given rise to non-state 
actors’ capability and capacity to undermine regional security and stability.91 Recently, 
near-peer state-actors have increased coercive activities that also negatively affect regional 
security and stability—for example, Russia’s actions compromising Ukraine’s national 
borders or China’s expansionist activities in the highly-disputed South China Sea. U.S. 
Diplomatic Missions led by the DOS, as well as strategic interactions planned by the GCCs, 
during peacetime governmental interactions are designed to augment Allies’ and Partners’ 
capability and capacity to provide for their own security and guarantee their continued 
sovereignty. The strategy being, to foster regional security and stability by increasing 
individual Ally and Partner nation’s capability and capacity to respond to persistent and 
emergent challenges to their sovereignty.92  
If, as many senior U.S. government officials have urged, our approach to foreign 
policy should be centered on applying the instruments of national power to create a more 
balanced engagement strategy that incorporates elements of soft power, then we should 
recognize the high value of SOF support to diplomatic objectives.93 As former Secretary 
of Defense (SECDEF) Robert Gates noted in several venues, there must be an increased 
investment in soft power capability and capacity—so much so that as the SECDEF he was 
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Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. 
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willing to volunteer some of the DoD’s budget to advocate a $36 billion-dollar increase to 
DOS’ foreign affairs budget to achieve what he viewed as an optimal balance between hard 
and soft power competencies.94  
Another former SECDEF, Leon Panetta, noted the need for strength when dealing 
with Russia’s actions in Eastern Ukraine.95 When describing strength, he stated that 
success is more likely when the “West is willing to enforce it with both economic and 
military support to the Ukrainians.”96 This should not be considered an appeal for a hard-
power approach, but rather the argument for a comprehensive and balanced response to 
state aggression that clearly impinged Ukrainian sovereignty. Panetta goes on to argue that 
providing military aid to Ukraine might not have defeated the Russians militarily, but 
reasonably may have sent a stronger message that the cost of undertaking such aggression 
could be higher than originally calculated.97 Although the scenario that former SECDEF 
Panetta describes are beyond Phase Zero, SOF could have achieved the actions he 
advocates in Phase Zero and changed Russia’s calculous, at least in pure-cost terms, by 
significantly increasing the Russian effort required for success.  
3. SOF Effects on Deterrence 
In “Bound to Fail,” John Arquilla noted several constraints that limit the U.S.’ 
ability to practice effective general and immediate deterrence.98 While the work is now 
over twenty years old, it remains applicable today providing an incisive and detailed look 
at how political, economic, and military constraints—in many ways of our own doing—
                                                 
94 Ann Scott Tyson, “Gates Urges Increased Funding for Diplomacy,” November 27, 2007, 
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have reduced the overall efficacy of post-Cold War deterrence.99 The article makes several 
recommendations to diminish the limiting factors of the constraints. From the perspective 
of SOF employment in Phase Zero, a key recommendation is the development of regional 
power balances. Although the argument is made primarily for a more cost-efficient 
approach to regional security development, it may apply more broadly in a Phase Zero 
extended deterrence scenario.  
Huth’s empirical analysis on deterrence, also nearly thirty years old, provides 
several additional perspectives useful to the Phase Zero conversation. Primarily, he 
suggests that a defender’s ability to field a comprehensive military defense that would pose 
an attacker with the prospect of a prolonged conflict and protracted occupation improves 
deterrence.100 If it is true that SOF employment in Phase Zero can lessen costs by 
precluding an expanded scope of conflict, it could also be true that this increases the costs 
associated with indirect challenges to Ally and Partner nation sovereignty. Huth also notes 
that there is a deterrent effect produced by a defender’s military and diplomatic reciprocity 
towards aggressors.101 While this may a practical selling point for SOF employment in 
Phase Zero, morally speaking any action of this type might best be considered under 
traditional just war concepts or those proposed later in Chapter III.  
The key to thinking practically about SOF employment in Phase Zero is 
understanding that SOF contribute both directly and indirectly to extended deterrence. In a 
direct sense, SOF enable Ally and Partner security force capability and capacity 
development, which in turn affects their ability to field a more effective general deterrence 
force of their own. Indirectly, the very presence of multi-lateral SOF interoperating within 
a sovereign nation credibly raises the costs of a potential aggressor. An aggressor must now 
calculate its costs based on the potential response of multiple nations instead of just one.  
                                                 
99 Arquilla lays out political, economic, and military constraints that are largely a result of the U.S.’ 
own doing. See Arquilla. 
100 Paul K. Huth, “Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War,” The American Political Science 
Review 82, no. 2 (June 1, 1988): 423–43. 
101 Huth. 
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As nation-state actors continue to provide irregular proxy or surrogate forces near-
peer capability in indirect competition, the effects of aggression transcend the historical 
paradigm of challenges to a nation’s sovereignty. These emergent challenges are 
distributed in nature as they defy Ally and Partner nation sovereignty in local, regional, 
national, and supranational affairs. SOF conduct FID and SFA in Phase Zero to facilitate 
the development of Ally and Partner security force capability and capacity which by design 
contributes to the execution of their own general deterrence strategy. The ability to 
effectively respond to challenges executed by state and non-state actors might produce a 
distributed deterrence effect across multiple spectrums and domains. Perhaps more 
importantly, this type of deterrence can lead to the distributed deterrence effect described 
above. 
B. MORAL REASONS FOR SOF IN PHASE ZERO 
While the above considerations provide ample reasons to conclude the U.S. 
government is justified on practical grounds in taking a more robust Phase Zero approach 
featuring SOF, there are further considerations that extend beyond merely the pragmatic. 
Namely, there are also significant moral advantages that can be achieved from a SOF 
focused Phase Zero approach. The primary moral justification of SOF in Phase Zero is that 
success precludes subsequent phases of conflict, which should be universally accepted as 
a morally superior outcome than continued conflict and escalation from competition to 
armed conflict. If we cannot convince the world of the necessity to avoid the terrible nature 
of armed conflict for moral reasons, then should we not provide those that would choose it 
every practical reason possible to avoid it? It is perhaps for this reason that we might find 
one of the more compelling aspects of the argument, there are sufficient practical and moral 
reasons for the U.S. Government to more effectively leverage SOF in Phase Zero. 
1. How SOF Affect Phase Zero Outcomes 
Admittedly, there are some serious risks in the Phase Zero approach. For example, 
an unintended escalation that might result in an armed conflict due to the perception of 
external intervention would be a catastrophic result, completely counter to the goal of 
Phase Zero. One could easily imagine a scenario in which an unsuccessful attempt at Phase 
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Zero might strategically signal an adversary to escalate incorrectly. While SOF 
operationalizes a strategy in Phase Zero, the strategy is developed by the DOS—which 
inherently limits the potential for this type of negative outcome. It is also a primary reason 
that the DOS’ foreign affairs capability and capacity must be resourced organizationally 
and financially.102 Not only does DOS primacy inherently bound incorrect strategic 
signaling, it also allows the DoD—SOF in particular, to operate by, with, and through Ally 
and Partner Militaries through their own government’s diplomatic request.103  
When a nation requests military support through its diplomatic processes, it 
exercises its sovereign right to dictate how it addresses challenges to its internal security. 
This in and of itself requires little moral justification, further than the sovereign request of 
a legitimate national government. Certainly, from a traditional just war theory perspective, 
there are established ideas on what constitutes a legitimate authority with respect to 
governments and when one would or would not be justified in supporting them. When these 
conditions are met, U.S. SOF partnership in Phase Zero is indicative of an agreement 
between two sovereign’s legitimate decision-makers. These types of exchanges between 
sovereigns reinforce the legalist paradigm.  
SOF Phase Zero activities with Ally and Partner militaries not only promote the 
exercise of Ally and Partner sovereignty but also seek to safe-guard autonomy. One of the 
manners that this is achieved is through the identification and establishment of threats, 
warnings, and indicators (TWIs).104 Without the capability or capacity to complete a 
comprehensive assessment of TWIs, any nation might find itself left open to clandestine or 
covert activities designed to subvert the legitimate government or impose the will of 
another state or non-state actor. Traditional just war theorists would likely agree that this 
type of subversion or imposition of will constitute unjust national aggression, violate the 
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legalist paradigm, and could constitute a legitimate casus belli in response.105 According 
to revisionist just war theory, these activities would likely represent an unjust intent and 
could also constitute justified casus belli. SOF campaign activities in Phase Zero are 
essential to developing nations in the periphery who have yet to cultivate experienced and 
mature internal security organizations capable of identifying clandestine or covert 
subversion.  
Successfully determining the presence of a clandestine or covert adversarial 
presence that inherently challenges a nation’s sovereignty is one thing, being able to either 
effectively interdict the act itself or positively attribute the actor—or both preferably is 
quite another. To be clear, interdicting adversarial acts that compromise a legitimate Ally 
or Partner nation would certainly cross a threshold—most especially if the interdiction is 
unilaterally achieved. This concept will be addressed more thoroughly further on in the 
chapter, but first, our focus must be on the capability and capacity to properly attribute 
adversarial acts that constitute national aggression.  
During competition below the level of armed conflict, state and non-state actors 
indirectly challenge the sovereignty of targeted legitimate national governments through 
clandestine or covert activities.106 SOF in Phase Zero train, provide or enhance Ally and 
Partner military capabilities and capacities to attribute an adversarial actor using SOF 
unique intelligence, targeting, and technological methods.107 Attribution is one of the most 
difficult tasks to achieve during Phase Zero, as our own internal discourse regarding 
alleged external influence in our own domestic election cycle demonstrates. Unless a nation 
makes very deliberate preparations, proper attribution can only be achieved ex post facto 
and in our case without conclusive proof of external interference or lack thereof—even 
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after nearly a year.108 Given this example, it is appropriate to explicitly mention that U.S. 
SOF expertise is not unlimited to a point that proper attribution can be guaranteed—only 
that the proverb two eyes are better than one certainly applies. U.S. SOF tactics, techniques, 
and procedures (TTPs) at the very least have the potential to increase the probability of 
success, especially when the problem is viewed from a resource perspective. Finite 
resources, particularly in manned, trained, and equipped professional SOF are challenging 
for any nation—but pooling the appropriate human capital while cultivating multilateral 
experience gives the best chance at a positive outcome.  
When these elements are viewed comprehensively, the potential for limiting an 
adversary’s capability and capacity to conduct indirect national aggression below the level 
of armed conflict provides a strong moral justification for the application of SOF in Phase 
Zero.109 More definitively, when regarded in the context of preventing the potential for 
escalation to overt warfare we might consider these types of actions not only as merely 
morally permissible but, in fact, as morally obligatory. Given the tremendously high moral 
stakes at play with the possibility of outright warfare, the chance of avoiding escalation 
altogether provided by Phase Zero operations may be ethically demanded of us.  
This discussion of the moral importance of SOF Phase Zero operations leads us to 
consider a potential expansion of the just war tradition canon to cover the ethical principles 
and criteria at play in these contexts. As discussed previously in Chapter I, just war theory 
delivers guidance on the justification for going to war (jus ad bellum), how ethically we 
ought to behave within war (jus in bello) and, more recently, moral considerations to be 
taken after war concludes (jus post bellum) and when, indeed, it is right to end it in the first 
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place (jus ex bello).110 Given the above discussions of the moral impact of Phase Zero on 
warfare, a twin set of criteria logically emerge as prospective expansions to the just war 
theory frame. First, I propose jus ad conflictum, as that set of principles covering when it 
is morally appropriate to pursue a comprehensive Phase Zero strategy. And, second, I 
propose jus in conflictus, as that set of principles that establish what undertakings are 
morally permissible within a just competition below the level of armed conflict. If such an 
expansion of the just war framework is plausible, then, of course, there is much more work 
to be done than can be achieved here to meaningfully treat the issue. Notwithstanding, there 
seem to be some clear criteria apparent that draw on traditional and revisionist elements of 
just war theory that can be explored as a rudimentary starting point for these twin criteria 
of jus ad conflictum and jus in conflictus.  
2. Jus ad Conflictum 
One of the primary considerations to determine the morality of applying SOF in 
Phase Zero should rightly focus on the traditionalist just war theory element known as the 
legalist paradigm.111 Walzer’s traditional description of the legalist paradigm maintains 
that all nations retain the right to be free from aggression to exercise their sovereignty and 
remain autonomous according to their own will. Perhaps this is the most important 
potential component to jus ad conflictum—a nation should not be viewed as just in its 
application of SOF in Phase Zero if the undertaking violates the sovereignty or imposes 
the will of one country on another. If that is the case, the action or actions should be viewed 
as a form of national aggression or worse—unjust warfare and not competition at all. There 
may be scenarios in which it might be morally permissible to suspend the legalist paradigm 
in order to meet jus ad conflictum criteria. If this is true, then the logic might follow 
traditional just war theory reasoning without a great need for expansion. These reasons 
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might make a strong moral, and traditional, justification for multilateral or combined 
Phase Zero.112  
Another principle that should likely be included in jus ad conflictum might follow 
a dominant revisionist component—just intent. The reasons for applying SOF in Phase 
Zero ought to have strong a reflection on the morality of the competition below the level 
of armed conflict. Certainly, if there is a high-probability of avoiding an armed conflict or 
the possibility of limiting the potential scope of an armed conflict exists, then a 
corresponding level of moral permissibility might be contemplated based on the possible 
outcome. Of course, following the revisionist view of just intent, the desired endstate 
should also weigh heavily on the considerations of the morality during the competition in 
Phase Zero, jus in conflictus, which will be addressed subsequently.  
Both these traditional and revisionist components begin to frame some key 
elements of jus ad conflictum. Specifically, that one should not be considered justified in 
applying SOF in Phase Zero if the act in and of itself constitutes aggression or the intent is 
not just. The application of SOF in Phase Zero should not be thought of as just if the aim 
is not considered a just intent. For example, the intent to expand one’s territory, subvert a 
legitimate government, or any other means that might interfere with a sovereign nation’s 
right to self-determine is not just. Conversely, if the aim is considered a just intent, such as 
to promote sovereignty, facilitate attribution of adversarial actors, or disrupt national 
aggression—it could potentially meet the criteria of jus ad conflictum and thus might be 
considered a morally permissible application of SOF in Phase Zero.  
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3. Jus in Conflictus 
If a nation determines that they are justified in employing SOF as part of a Phase 
Zero strategy, then they should strive to do so according to certain moral parameters and 
bounds in competition below the level of armed conflict. Jus in conflictus might require 
more significant debate to achieve any sort of meaningful consensus in that it requires a 
high degree of understanding to consider the precise elements of SOF capability and when 
they might constitute just practices in Phase Zero. It is clear, however, that just practices 
(acts grounded in proportionality and discrimination) are a key element to jus in 
conflictus—meaning that again we might agree that there are clear traditionalist and 
revisionist elements to the morality of the issue.  
SOF campaign activities in Phase Zero should be just in their practice in order to 
meet potential criteria under jus in conflictus. For example, we might consider a U.S. 
Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha (SFODA) assigned as a pilot team during 
Phase Zero. An SFODA acting as a pilot team might be expected to identify essential 
elements of an operating environment. Essential elements would likely include 
assessments of armed factions within an ineffectively governed geographical area to 
validate their ideological compatibility, understand their goals and objectives, and 
determine whether or not human rights violations are occurring. These practices appear to 
be just in that they are aimed at determining with finality what decision makers think they 
know and a more precise understanding of a given, and usually complex, situation.  
An example of potentially unjust practice in Phase Zero that readily comes to mind 
is coercion. Assigning SOF to conduct Phase Zero campaign activities in a nation that are 
coercive in nature may not be morally permissible under a fully articulated jus in conflictus. 
However, under certain conditions coercion may be justified using familiar just war 
thinking vis-à-vis the requirements for intervention or preemption. Conversely, if the 
practices are aimed at simply influencing they could be considered just and therefore 
allowable under jus in conflictus. Of course, nuanced distinctions between coercion and 
influence would likely be contentious, tenuous, and difficult—requiring more thorough 
treatment than can be given here. Moreover, whether a jus in conflictus act is deemed 
permissible or not may itself be impacted by the jus ad conflictum considerations of a given 
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Phase Zero operation.113 But these are the kinds of matters a fully spelled out jus in 
conflictus would need to address. 
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revisionist just war theorists on whether jus in bello practices are morally impacted by the jus ad bellum 
considerations of a given military operation. McMahan, Killing in War. 
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IV. CONTEXTUALIZING RUSSIA’S ACTIONS IN UKRAINE 
2013–2015 USING THE EXPANSION 
In 2014, the world watched as Crimea changed hands following the Ukrainian 
Revolution of Dignity (known more popularly as the Euromaidan) at the hands of military-
equipped, well-trained, and expert separatists.114 The conflict continued to escalate as the 
Donbas Region of Eastern Ukraine descended into armed revolt, seemingly at the hands of 
organic separatists who employed incredible organization, main-battle tanks, and heavy 
artillery with proficiency normally displayed by a professional military force.115 Of 
course, the Kremlin’s official narrative regarding these phenomena made an exceptional 
and utilitarian use of the language of traditional just war theory. From the very beginning, 
the Russian Federation’s messaging detailed a Ukrainian fascist coup d’état meant to limit 
the rights of the Ukrainian people to self-determine through their duly-elected President, 
Viktor Yanukovych.116 After Yanukovych fled to Russia and actions in eastern Ukraine 
intensified the Russian narrative continued along a similar tack describing a 
disenfranchised and ethnically Russian population that revolted against an unjust, ultra-
nationalist (even fascist), and illegal Ukrainian government that committed unspeakable 
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crimes against humanity in these areas.117  We knew at the time that these accusations 
were likely not true, and we know now that they are most certainly not.118  
Bodies like the United Nations did not recognize the annexation of the Crimea and, 
accurately, decried Russia’s following actions in Eastern Ukraine as national 
aggression.119 The Minsk Agreement slowed, but did not stop, the offensive in Eastern 
Ukraine, but not before observers and news sources captured ample evidence of Russian 
brigade tactical groups crossing the Ukrainian border and subsequently withdrawing back 
to Russian territory after engaging Ukrainian defense forces in their own country.120 While 
the Kremlin claims that these brigade-sized elements of Russian main-line military tanks, 
self-propelled artillery, mechanized infantry and air defenses were all manned by 
separatists we know now that, even as outlandish as it sounded it the time, it was, in fact, 
Russian regular military forces who removed their Russian flags and replaced them with 
white arm bands to represent their supposed separatist identities.121  
Once their troops began crossing the Ukrainian border to support the separatist 
Dnieper People’s Republic, the Russian Federation crossed a significant moral boundary, 
as well as a legal boundary under international law, and an important constituent element 
of just war theory.122 Although covert, the action constituted an armed intervention that 
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clearly violated the legalist paradigm as described by Walzer.123 The tanks, soldiers, and 
military convoys that crossed the border represent the visible part of these events, much 
like an iceberg—they are above the waterline and plainly seen. But what about the two-
thirds of the iceberg located beneath the water-line? In this case, the Russian operations to 
prepare the environment through irregular and political actions—that is, Russian Phase 
Zero operations—should be viewed by the international community as equal violations of 
the principles of just war theory every bit as much as they would the more traditional armed 
incursions that occurred in the Donbass region. Indeed, this case provides an excellent 
example of some reasons why, and how, the just war theory framework could and should 
be expanded into jus ad conflictum and jus in conflictus to include competition below the 
level of armed conflict.  
A. THE POSSIBILITY OF IRREGULAR OPERATIONS DURING THE 
EUROMAIDAN 
Late in 2013, the Ukrainian Parliament passed a resolution with widespread support 
that would associate Ukraine with the European Union (EU) resulting in reform-based 
loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).124 Entry requirements for EU 
accession include a variety of requirements codified in a document known as the acquis 
communautaire, thirty-five chapters of law and organizing principles that represent the 
values of the EU.125 The acquis primarily ensures for a common legal-framework and the 
free movement of people, capital, and goods.126 The EU and Ukrainian Rada purpose-built 
the reforms of the Ukrainian political process and judiciary system to facilitate Ukraine’s 
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eventual application and accession into the EU.127 Former Ukrainian President Viktor 
Yanukovych, largely viewed as an elected Russian-surrogate, refused to sign the measure; 
he instead unilaterally signed a fifteen-billion-dollar loan-deal with Russia without the 
support of the Ukrainian Rada.128 The action resulted in the January protests that would 
eventually grow into the five-day Revolution of Dignity and led to his ouster in late 
February.129  
Through their elected representatives in the Rada who unanimously voted for the 
measure, the people of Ukraine had overwhelmingly supported Europeanization and a 
move away from Moscow’s orbit. While Russia’s political elite had interfered in Ukraine’s 
past attempts to move closer to the west, Russia had continually warned Ukraine that 
moving towards either EU or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership 
would not be tolerated, and as such constituted a red-line of sorts for Moscow.130  
During the initial protests in Independence Square, Yanukovych attempted to 
remain in power by declaring a state of emergency which resulted in the suspension of the 
Ukrainian constitution and the mobilization of an elite and federalized counter-terrorism 
and internal security unit, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU).131 There have been 
accusations surrounding the SBU’s actions that led to the death of over 100 protesters on 
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February 20, 2014.132 The Ukrainian government claimed one year later that the Russian 
Main Intelligence Agency (GRU) had supported the SBU with its premier counter-terror 
and internal security unit, Alpha.133 The Russian government flatly denies the claim while 
evidence remains either illusive or difficult to verify.134 Further demonstrating the 
inherently challenging task of correctly attributing aggression, either by state or non-state 
actors that challenges the sovereignty of a nation—in this case, Ukraine. However, it strains 
credulity to believe that the Russian government provided neither direct nor indirect 
support of the SBU’s objectives set by Former President Yanukovych.135  
The SBU and GRU have a well-developed history of conducting combined training 
and security operations resulting in both countries’ elite units having an incredible degree 
of interoperability. Evidence suggests the GRU’s Alpha unit was providing either on-site 
indirect support or conducting security force assistance operations during the actions that 
resulted in the deaths of the protestors.136 The evidence that places the GRU’s Alpha unit 
in the same place as SBU forces during the actions on February 20, 2014, coupled with 
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Moscow’s talking points and strategic interest in keeping Yanukovych in power make it 
appear likely that Russia, at a minimum, was providing support to Yanukovych’s SBU.   
In interstate interaction, it is neither unusual nor patently immoral to influence 
outcomes or provide security force assistance to another country—particularly when 
viewed from a Westphalian balance-of-power perspective. State actors routinely attempt 
to influence other nations and do so certainly to benefit their respective agendas, but this 
in and of itself does not indicate an inherently immoral or unethical interaction. At this 
point in the case prior to the actual revolution, it remains somewhat unclear whether Russia 
had undertaken any action that would directly violate the norms and conventions of the 
traditional just war theory framework. Even so, Russia’s warnings and historical 
relationship with respect to Ukraine’s Western ambitions should have triggered cautionary 
signs throughout the international community. Or, at the very least, these factors should 
have alluded to the strong possibility of covert or clandestine activity that might limit 
Ukraine’s ability to self-determine or exercise sovereignty within its borders. 
Although traditional violations of just war theory are not readily apparent, any time 
SOF are used for offensive purposes that inherently compromise the integrity of a state 
actor or limit a polity’s ability to conduct its political process, a breach of sovereignty can 
be deduced. As such, this form of ‘covert aggression’ against a state could potentially be 
considered a violation of traditional just war theory jus ad bellum norms and thereby should 
be considered an unjust and immoral use of SOF. Admittedly, however, this kind of 
conclusion forces jus ad bellum conclusions on acts that are clearly occurring before 
outright armed conflict began. As such, this kind of moral pronouncement fits 
uncomfortably within the standard expanse of the just war tradition. Alternatively, 
however, this form of ‘covert aggression’ could be considered a violation of the jus ad 
conflictum expansion of the framework suggested in Chapter III. This way of outlining 
Russia’s actions offers a more straight-forward read of how Ukraine’s sovereignty was 
rapidly diminished as a pre-cursor to armed conflict. As such, this depiction of events offers 
a more comprehensive explanatory force as opposed to forcing activities below the level 
of armed conflict into an inadequate jus ad bellum framework.  
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B. IRREGULAR CONFLICT GIVES WAY TO UNCONVENTIONAL 
WARFARE 
Five days later, on February 25, 2014, the Ukrainian Parliament initiated and passed 
a vote of no confidence, established an interim government, immediately restored the 
Ukrainian Constitution and solidified plans to conduct an election within months in 
accordance with Ukrainian Constitutional Law.137 In part, the political action was a result 
of concurrent negotiations and debates in the Ukrainian Rada that reached an agreement, 
meeting the required three-fourths threshold to execute constitutional changes, effectively 
reinstating elements illegally changed by Yanukovych.138 The following day, Russian 
Spetsnaz began an unconventional warfare campaign to take control of the Crimean 
Peninsula.139 On February 27, 2014, some 60 well-armed and unmarked men conducted a 
direct action operation to take control of the Crimean Parliamentary building.140 While the 
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Kremlin never admitted to the operation, it is unlikely that any group of separatists, or even 
Russian regular forces, could have executed the operation with the precision and speed 
required to plan, set-conditions, and execute the operation to achieve success. In the 
following days, the international media observed direct action operations of similar scope 
on governance targets throughout the Crimean Peninsula and the Donbass Region.141 
When considering these events, the timeline should not be overlooked—specifically the 
speed and synchronicity required to rapidly seize key governmental infrastructure across 
three-regions of Ukraine only forty-eight hours after the Rada’s official vote to remove 
Yanukovych.  
These actions marked a serious expansion of Russian operations, crossing several 
important thresholds relevant to the issue at hand. Russian GRU and Spetsnaz operatives 
transitioned from Phase Zero influence and shaping type actions to Phase Two actions to 
seize the initiative. Here, it is important to make clear that even though Russian operations 
were covert in nature—meaning they attempted to conceal both the actor and the act—they 
should still be viewed as an armed conflict. Simply removing one’s Velcro national flag 
insignia from a uniform and replacing it with a white arm-band does not make you any less 
a Russian Soldier.142 Also noteworthy is the technical military lexical descriptions used to 
characterize the events detailed above. For example, tactical tasks like “rapidly seize” or 
operational descriptions of core activities like “direct action” are generally indicative of a 
shift from a Phase Zero scenario.  
While just war theory generally does not adequately address such forms of irregular 
warfare, we can assume that using irregular military forces in direct action operations to 
limit self-determination indicate that any scenario which an external state or non-state actor 
seeks to impose its will on the population of another country constitutes aggression.143 As 
such, the traditional norms of the standard just war theory framework will apply. At that 
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point, the principles governing jus ad conflictum and jus in conflictus would no longer be 
the prism through which to apply moral evaluation to the situation. The unconventional 
warfare operations conducted by Russian irregular forces clearly fits this description of 
aggression. On most accounts, then, it seems it would constitute a violation of jus ad bellum 
and the grounds for an appropriate belli.  
This transition from the proposed expansion to more traditional just war 
argumentation is critical for several reasons. As demonstrated, these events, when viewed 
through the continuum of conflict, reveal the Kremlin’s intentions to be other than just. 
Even more importantly, the events following the transition demonstrate a wider scope of 
conflict moving more towards large-scale combat operations. Chapter IV sections C and D 
addresses Russian activities beyond Phase Zero through the traditional just war perspective 
to demonstrate the moral consequences of failing to correctly identify and validate 
precursor activities in a pre-armed conflict state. Moreover, the examples of continued 
Russian irregular warfare outlined in this chapter demonstrate the moral strength of a key 
argument developed in Chapter III. In this case, a jus ad conflictum framework applied to 
SOF in support of Ukraine, from say the U.S. or Europe for example, might have 
successfully attributed Russian precursor activities in their Phase Zero. This demonstrates 
how a revised just war theory framework, specifically the proposed jus ad conflictum and 
jus in conflictus offerings from Chapter III, may have provided the evaluative and 
normative tools for the international community to make more informed and meaningful 
decisions to bound the scope of violence.  
All just war theorists, of course, agree that there are times when armed intervention 
is morally permissible. Namely, those times when the principles of jus ad bellum are met, 
such as just cause, just intent, last resort, legitimate authority, and so on.144 Not 
surprisingly, the Kremlin made several claims, albeit well after Russia had taken control 
of Crimea and began operating in Eastern Ukraine, two of which would seemingly have 
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satisfied criteria for a just intervention. The first Kremlin claim for potential legitimacy 
was Russian support to secessionists in Crimea to prevent oppression of separatists by the 
Ukrainian Government.145 The second claim was Russian humanitarian intervention to 
prevent unnecessary human-loss at the hands of Ukrainian ultra-national fascists.146 
Regardless of inadequate attempts to justify Russia’s intervention in Phase Two, 
the proposed revision of the just war theory framework could provide the additional clarity 
to apply a more precise moral evaluation of the observed precursor activities. If the 
proposed expansion is feasible, an additional benefit of providing decision and policy 
makers a more defined perspective of illegitimate Phase Zero activities designed, as in this 
case, to set-conditions for armed conflict.  
Further, conclusions drawn from activities evaluated by jus ad conflictum and jus 
in conflictus might have significant implications on our subsequent jus ad bellum, and 
perhaps even jus in bello, judgments of any escalated conflicts.  
C. RUSSIAN NARRATIVES MAKE USE OF JUST WAR THEORY 
In order to further discussion, it is necessary to continue the narrative of Russian 
activities beyond the author’s proposition. This is meant to establish several important 
aspects of the discussion. Primarily, that there are serious moral consequences for failing 
in Phase Zero—and in this case, the international community may bear some responsibility 
for failing to understand the gravity of the situation. Additionally, the next several sections 
are meant to remind us that there has been no resolution, and Russia is doing everything it 
can to justify its continued involvement—co-opting the language of just war theory. 
Finally, it is meant to leave the reader with two ideas. The first, that this outcome may have 
been avoided, as it is certainly not justified according to the proposed expansion or just war 
thinking, and the second that we might yet be able to intervene below the level of armed 
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conflict using the ideas proposed here. This section seeks to identify the weaknesses of 
Russian justifications through the more traditional application of just war theory.  
First, Vladimir Putin claimed that the people of Crimea were conducting a civil war 
with the goal of secession.147 This claim is difficult to disprove with finality, however, and 
according to Walzer the burden of proof (which he rightly argues should be high for the 
use of military force) falls on the intervening state.148 Unsurprisingly, the Kremlin made 
every attempt to portray the Ukrainians, as well as the U.S. and NATO, as the 
aggressors.149 Even so, it is quite difficult to argue that within forty-eight hours a 
Ukrainian interim government (that had already set a date for inclusive elections) had 
managed to disenfranchise the population of Crimea, and just as fast, the disenfranchised 
population had organized themselves toward a secessionist movement. Given the history 
between Russia, the Ukraine, and Crimea, it is particularly difficult to imagine a region 
with the most autonomous rights within Ukraine and adequate representation within the 
parliament could decide, virtually overnight, that secession was their only option. It seems 
equally unlikely that the Ukrainian interim government could decide or even mount any 
type of oppressive measures in the same measure of time. Given these conditions, it is 
apparent that the Russian Federation did not meet traditional just war conventions for a 
legitimate military intervention on behalf of a secessionist movement.150 
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Vladimir Putin and the Russian Federation made, and continue to reinforce, 
accusations that ultra-nationalist fascists constitute the Ukrainian interim government.151 
The accusations have ranged from rhetoric to serious human-rights violations executed by 
Ukrainian volunteer units. The Kremlin exploited these claims to justify additional military 
involvement and reinforced Vladimir Putin’s primary narrative of the Russian Federation 
acting as moral agents to limit unnecessary human-loss.152 Approaching the legitimacy of 
the Kremlin’s military intervention from a just war theory perspective, the only condition 
is sufficient “moral shock” of humanity.153 Michael Walzer points out that politicians, and 
states, have ulterior motives that are more often than not rooted in utilitarian agendas.154 
In order to analyze the Russian argument within Walzer’s framework, observers must parse 
the chronology of events to omit allegations that occurred after the Russians executed their 
military intervention. Note that the entirety of allegations against the Ukrainians, in fact, 
occurred after the Russians intervened militarily, making the Russian claim for justification 
to intercede actually an argument of jus in bello rather than the supposed jus ad bellum 
grounds. Walzer does not, of course, make any argument for humanitarian preemption. 
Walzer, among many in the traditional just war theory frame, would likely view the very 
concept as an illegitimate revision to the legalist paradigm that is excessively permissive 
and immoral in its potential to unnecessarily subordinate the value of human life to state 
ambitions.155  
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The traditional just war development of jus ad bellum, when applied to the Russian 
military intervention in Crimea and the Donbass Region, clearly deconstructs the Russian 
narrative and reveals an unjustified predication for armed conflict. Russia’s use of 
unconventional warfare to separate a people from their legitimate representative 
government using information operations that include political coercion and propaganda 
are examples of oppression.156 The Kremlin failed to sufficiently justify a just cause for 
its military intervention and violated the Ukraine’s territorial integrity and political 
sovereignty, which are Walzer’s two elements of aggression.157 Beyond the traditional 
Walzerian characterization of the constituent elements of aggression, the existence of state 
aggression is an exceedingly clear violation of jus ad bellum and therefore represents the 
key characteristics of an unjust armed conflict. Outside the typified orthodoxy of just war 
theory that Walzer represents, it would be unlikely that one might find a just war theorist 
that would not agree that state aggression that resulted in armed intervention represents an 
unjust cause.   
D. RUSSIAN ACTIONS AND CONTINUING INVOLVEMENT IN EASTERN 
UKRAINE 
Beginning on February 25, 2015, the Russian Federation began unconventional 
warfare and major combat operations in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine.158 The result of the 
Russian military operations is the persistent occupation of Crimea and ongoing hostilities 
in the Donbass Region of Eastern Ukraine. After the Russians occupied Crimea, they 
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oversaw the Crimean Status Referendum, which offered voters the option to join the 
Russian Federation. An incredulously high voter turnout of 83.1% coupled with an equally 
incredulous 96.77% vote in favor of joining Russia led to the Duma and Vladimir Putin’s 
ratification of Crimean annexation.159  Although the UN did not recognize the annexation 
of Crimea, the Russian Federation considered its occupation of Crimea complete and 
focused its efforts on Eastern Ukraine.160 The Donbass Region, particularly Luhansk, 
Debaltseve, Donetsk, and a drive towards Mariupol, represent a preponderance of Russia’s 
military effort. Although the Russian’s use of military force is not justifiable using the 
traditional development of jus ad bellum, observers can further analyze Russia’s conduct 
of the war through the perspective of the second component of just war theory: jus in 
bello.161 The Russian unconventional warfare campaign executed by their surrogates, 
irregular, and regular forces are by nature oppressive and undermine the legitimacy of 
Russia’s execution of the war.162  
In order to apply the framework of jus in bello to events in the Donbass Region, it 
is necessary to unmask Russian involvement in the events of Eastern Ukraine. Shortly after 
GRU Spetsnaz forces seized key regional government facilities in Crimea on February 27, 
2014, similar direct action operations occurred throughout the Donbass Region in the first 
weeks of March.163 The official Kremlin narrative posits that separatists undertook these 
complex direct action operations, but the international media provided evidence attributing 
                                                 
159 The Duma is the Legislative Body of the Russian Federation. Crimean Status Referendum 
statistics demonstrate a high probability of tampering and/or coercion. Harding and Walker, “Crimea 
Applies to Be Part of Russian Federation after Vote to Leave Ukraine.” 
160 United Nations General Assembly, “General Assembly Adopts Resolution Calling upon States 
Not to Recognize Changes in Status of Crimea Region.” 
161 Jus in bello is the principle of acting justly during war, which provides a set of moral values that 
describe how war should be conducted by soldiers doing the fighting. See, Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars. 
among others.  
162 Additionally, Walzer’s just war theory expansion of extreme emergency and double-effect are not 
applicable to the Kremlin’s violations of the war convention. 
163 The U.S. DoD defines direct action in Joint Publication 1-02 as, “Short-duration strikes and other 
small-scale offensive actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or diplomatically sensitive 
environments and which employ specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, 
or damage designated targets.” Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02. 
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the operations to members of the 22nd and 45th Spetsnaz Regiments.164 The weeks 
following the initial disruption of the Donbass population’s ability to interact with their 
legitimate and elected representation, the Russians supported a budding insurgency by 
mounting effective information operations, providing equipment, and logistic support to 
separatist forces.165 The Russian support to the separatists includes command and control 
(C2), artillery support, and military reinforcement.166 The Russians exercised C2 of 
separatist forces through GRU agents embedded within the separatist command units; 
examples are Igor Girkin and Igor Bezler.167 These facts contradict the official Kremlin 
narrative, but more importantly establish Russian responsibility for the moral conduct of 
separatist forces operating under their leadership. Regardless of the lack of an appropriate 
                                                 
164 The New York Times published an article featuring photos of known Russian Spetsnaz Operators 
linking them to operations in Crimea and Donbass. Higgins, Gordon, and Kramer, “Photos Link Masked 
Men in East Ukraine to Russia.” 
165 Herszenhorn and Baker, Russia Steps up Help for Rebels in Ukraine War. 
166 The U.S. DoD defines command and control in Joint Publication 1-02 as, “The exercise of 
authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the 
accomplishment of the mission.” Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 1-02. The Daily Beast reported in 
2014 that John Kerry disclosed U.S. intelligence reports that identify Russia’s orders to Ukrainian 
separatists. Josh Rogin and Eli Lake, “Kerry: U.S. Taped Moscow’s Calls to Its Ukraine Spies,” Daily 
Beast, April 29, 2014, sec. World, https://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/04/29/kerry-u-s-taped-
moscow-s-calls-to-its-ukraine-spies. The OSCE included in a spot report its observation of the movement 
of unmarked Russian 122mm Artillery pieces, BTR armored personnel carriers, T72 main battle tanks, and 
T64 main battle tanks into Ukraine from Russia. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE), “Spot Report by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), 8 November 2014 | 
OSCE,” OSCE, November 8, 2014, https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/126483. 
167 GRU stands for <<Гла́вное разве́дывательное управле́ние>> which in Russian means “main 
intelligence directorate” [Translation by Scott Orr 2015].  BBC’s Jon Sopel attains a video “purporting to 
show a Russian soldier instructing Ukrainian Police” which depicts a unformed man with no insignia 
indicating he is a Russian Agent and that the Horlivka Police are under new leadership. The man in the 
video is positively identified and confirmed in this thesis as Russian Lieutenant Colonel Igor Bezler. Jon 
Sopel, “‘Russian Soldier’ Instructs Ukraine Police,” BBC News, April 14, 2014, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-europe-27022548/russian-lieutenant-colonel-meets-ukrainian-police-
officers.  Ukraine’s Ministry of Internal Affairs produced a wanted announcement for Bezler, see photo on 
page 60 from Interfax Ukraine, <<Национальна Полиция, УА>> “National Police Ukraine,” “<<УВАГА! 
РОЗШУКУЄТЬСЯ БЄЗЛЄР ІГОР МИКОЛАЙОВИЧ>> ‘Attention! Wanted Igor Bezler’ [Translated by 
Scott W. Orr 2015],” National Police Unit, Ukraine, <<Розшук терористів>> “Wanted Terrorists,” August 
14, 2014, 
http://old.npu.gov.ua/mvs/control/main/uk/publish/article/1124724;jsessionid=C954FA62EB7596F4B1B79
744B1429398. Additionally, BBC Ukrainian service reported in 2014 that Girkin, also known as Strelkov, 
is the overall GRU commander on the ground in Donbass <<ББС Україн>> “BBC Ukraine,” “<<СБУ: 
агент Стрелков - доказательство диверсий России>> ‘SBU: Agent Strelkov - proof of Russian sabotage’ 
[Translated by Scott W. Orr 2015],” News, BBC, 2014, 
https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/ukraine_in_russian/2014/04/140416_ru_s_russian_agent_experts. 
 58 
justification for the war itself, jus in bello calls both state and non-state actors to withstand 
moral examination of their conduct.168 
In July 2014, a surface-to-air missile destroyed a Malaysian Airlines Boeing 777–
200ER near Donetsk while traveling from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur. International 
observers and the associated press quickly identified the launching system as a Russian 
Buk, known also by its NATO designation SA-17 Grizzly.169 The Buk is a self-propelled 
tracked vehicle that is unable to operate without a minimum of three vehicles: a command 
vehicle, target acquisition radar (TAR), and transporter erector launcher (TEL). The Buk 
normally operates as part of a battalion, which consists of one command vehicle, one TAR, 
and six TELs. The Kremlin spuriously claimed that a Ukrainian SU-25, a close air-support 
attack jet designed for the air-to-ground anti-tank mission similar to the U.S. A-10, shot 
down the civilian aircraft.170 An online gamer, Eliot Higgins, used open-source images 
collected through social media to prove that the Buk not only came from Russia but is 
currently back in its regular unit, the 53rd Buk Battalion stationed at Kursk, Russia.171 
Higgins also established that Russian military commanders dispatched the 53rd Buk 
Battalion for “exercises” across the border from Donetsk in Russia, making it probable that 
regular Russian forces operated the Buk surface-to-air launch systems within Eastern 
Ukraine.172 Russian regular forces are participating in the conflict in unmarked vehicles 
                                                 
168 “The argument is twofold: that war is sometimes justifiable and that the conduct of war is always 
subject to criticism.” Page ix. Walzer, Arguing about War. 
169 A Washington Post article summarizes the U.S. intelligence estimate from July 2014. Greg Miller, 
“U.S. Discloses Intelligence on Downing of Malaysian Jet,” Washington Post, July 22, 2014, sec. National 
Security, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-discloses-intelligence-on-downing-
of-malaysian-jet/2014/07/22/b178fe58-11e1-11e4-98ee-daea85133bc9_story.html.A photo of the Buk is 
located in Figure 3.  Buk or SA-17 Grizzly, Command Vehicle (left), TAR (Target Acquisition Radar) 
middle, TEL (Transporter Erector Launcher) right. 
170 English Pravda, a Russian state-sponsored propaganda outlet, echoed the Kremlin’s repeated 
claims. Dmitry Sudakov, “Secret Witness Claims Ukrainian Su-25 Downed Malaysian Boeing MH17,” 
PravdaReport, December 23, 2014, http://www.pravdareport.com/hotspots/disasters/23-12-2014/129365-
witness_malaysian_boeing_ukraine-0/. 
171 Higgins used a Kickstarter campaign to start an open source analysis service named Bellingcat to 
track the missile launcher from Russia and its return after the incident. Bellingcat Investigation Team, 
“Origin of the Separatists’ Buk: A Bellingcat Investigation,” Bellingcat, November 8, 2014, 
https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2014/11/08/origin-of-the-separatists-buk-a-bellingcat-
investigation/. 
172 Bellingcat Investigation Team. 
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and uniforms, save for their white armbands indicating their belonging to the separatist 
movement.173 Additionally, the international media reported Ukrainian government 
claims of an intercepted phone call between Igor Bezler and Russian GRU Colonel Vasili 
Geranin reporting the incident.174 See Figure 3. A Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs 
wanted announcement displaying Igor Bezler in a Russian GRU Lieutenant Colonel 
uniform. There is no way to definitively ascertain whether Russian soldiers or separatists 
operated the Buk, of course, nor if the operators knowingly targeted a civilian airliner. In 
either scenario, the Russians violated the war convention by coordinating and providing 
the lethal means to successfully target and attack the civilian airliner.  
A defender of the Russians here could perhaps offer an appeal to Walzer’s principle 
of extreme emergency. This principle could justify the introduction of the capability if the 
Russians assessed the likelihood of two conditions established by Walzer. According to 
Walzer, the Russians would need to establish the immediacy and scope of a threat to their 
soldiers. An alleged phone call, however, indicates that Russian surrogates believed they 
had downed a Ukrainian AN-26, a military cargo aircraft incapable of carrying offensive 
capabilities.175 While an AN-26 constitutes a legitimate military target, if there was any 
uncertainty in the initial assessment of Russian surrogates or soldiers would have had 
enough time to validate the targeted airplanes identity without any threat of attack. 
                                                 
173 Simon Ostrovsky of Vice News has reported several times in his dispatches the nature of Russian 
active-duty member’s involvement in Eastern Ukraine, he covers it most thoroughly in his special report. 
VICE News, Selfie Soldiers. 
174 International Business Times printed a transcript and video of the alleged phone call see, 
Alessandria Masi, “MH17 Crash: Full Transcript Of Alleged Phone Intercepts Between Russian 
Intelligence Officers [VIDEO],” International Business Times, July 7, 2014, 
http://www.ibtimes.com/mh17-crash-full-transcript-alleged-phone-intercepts-between-russian-intelligence-
1631992., 2014. Also, CNN played a video recording of the alleged phone call, see Mariano Castillo, 
“Alleged Phone Call: ‘We Have Just Shot Down a Plane,’” CNN, July 18, 2014, 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/18/world/europe/ukraine-mh17-intercepted-audio/index.html. 
175 It is, at least, somewhat clear in the following sources—if the alleged phone recordings are 
legitimate—that Russian Spetsnaz and surrogate forces believed that were indeed targeting a military cargo 
AN-26. Castillo, “Alleged Phone Call”; Paul Roderick Gregory, “Here Are The Intercepted Transcripts 
Indicating Russian Rebels Shot Down Malaysian Flight MH17,” Forbes, July 19, 2014, 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/paulroderickgregory/2014/07/19/what-more-smoking-guns-are-needed-for-
mh17-the-worlds-first-sam-terrorism/; Robert Windrem and Mike Brunker, “MH17 Shootdown: Russian 




Walzer’s expansion of double-effect also excludes the legitimacy of this action. While the 
act of targeting an AN-26 is a legitimate act of war with a morally acceptable outcome, the 
destruction of military supplies, the Russians assumed no risk in mitigating potential 
civilian casualties and the act could not accomplish “sufficient good” in its effect.176 Even 
if, from the Russian perspective, the aircraft may have been one AN-26 viewed within the 
context of a massive military airlift campaign—it was still only one aircraft misidentified 
as an AN-26, which would have had a relatively small impact on the war and should have 
sufficiently reduced the urgency of the targeting process thus allowing for the correct 
identification of the civilian airliner. Consequently, the delivery of one AN-26 worth of 
military cargo would have been negligible in military effect, and therefore an unjustifiable 
breach of the jus in bello principles of proportionality and military necessity.  
                                                 
176 Explicitly defined by Walzer, “1) The act is good in itself or at least indifferent, which means, for 
our purposes, that it is a legitimate act of war. 2) The direct effect is morally acceptable—the destruction of 
military supplies, for example, or the killing of enemy soldiers. 3) The intention of the actor is good, that is 
he aims only at the acceptable effect; the evil effect is not one of his ends, nor is it a means to his ends. 4) 
The good effect is sufficiently good to compensate for allowing the evil effect; it must be justifiable under 
Sidgwick's proportionality rule.” Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars. p153. 
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Figure 3.  A Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs Wanted Announcement 
Displaying Igor Bezler in a Russian GRU Lieutenant Colonel 
Uniform177 
                                                 
177 Source: <<Национальна Полиция, УА>> “National Police Ukraine,” “<<УВАГА! 
РОЗШУКУЄТЬСЯ БЄЗЛЄР ІГОР МИКОЛАЙОВИЧ>> ‘Attention! Wanted Igor Bezler’ [Translated by 




Figure 4.  Left: Buk or SA-17 Grizzly, Command Vehicle; Middle: TAR (Target 
Acquisition Radar); Right: TEL (Transporter Erector Launcher)178 
The facts surrounding the Russian unconventional warfare campaign, specifically 
its unofficial involvement in Eastern Ukraine, uncovers the most glaring violation of jus in 
bello: the Kremlin cannot achieve a military desired end state without violating, and 
continuing to violate, the war convention. If the Kremlin’s narrative of preventing human 
loss as moral agents is true, then there is no reason to obfuscate its involvement. The only 
reason to conceal the actor is to disguise state-sponsored aggression designed to wrest the 
population away from the Ukrainian government. By coordinating the actions of the 
separatists through GRU C2, the Russians can continually isolate the population from 
Ukrainian aid using the separatists to violate the war convention allowing the Russian 
                                                 




regular forces to speed, unfettered, across the border to deliver Russian aid.179 These facts 
reveal the true purpose of not validating the Buk’s targeting; it likely did not matter if it 
was an AN-26 or a civilian airliner. It made no difference if it was military supplies or not 
because the intended effect was not the destruction of war material. The intended effect 
was to demonstrate the lack of security the Ukrainian government is able to provide in its 
own country. It is in these facts and demonstration that reveal the Kremlin’s true purpose 
to annex Eastern Ukraine as it did Crimea by violating Eastern Ukraine’s right to self-
determination.  
E. CONCLUSIONS FROM RUSSIAN INVOLVEMENT 
When viewed in context with other Russian interventions in South Ossetia, 
Transnistria, Chechnya, and Azerbaijan, Russia’s actions should not be viewed as justified 
Phase Zero campaign activities at all. We ought to call them what they are—deliberate acts 
of aggression meant not only to impose the Kremlin’s will upon Kiev—and others—but to 
expand its physical territory. In short, it was an unjust political warfare campaign followed 
by an unjust unconventional war that resulted in serious negative consequences for 
Ukrainian residents in the Donbas Region.  
While Russian actions began as contemporary examples of Phase Zero, they very 
clearly escalated to an armed conflict that continues today. Perhaps if actors like the U.S. 
or Europeans had committed to justified Phase Zero actions the outcome may have been 
different—or perhaps not, it is impossible to say. Yet, this example more clearly 
demonstrates the necessity of an expansion of the just war theory framework to include the 
morality of competition below the level of armed conflict. There is, of course, much more 
room for discussion on this case in particular. For example, it is only reasonably clear to 
the author when and where exactly Russian activities in Phase Zero became unjustified. 
Chapter IV attempts to show this point, but we must admit that these issues can, and may 
always remain, incredibly contentious. It is precisely for that reason that this case is 
                                                 
179 Ostrovsky’s interview of several isolated locals displays their hatred for the separatists who steal 
their belongings and food. It also shows their love for the Russian soldiers who provide them food and 
shelter. VICE News, Selfie Soldiers. 
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described here, its complexity is indicative of the nature of contemporary warfare in which 
capabilities are applied indirectly and irregularly—and if allowed to continue unopposed 
the result is an undeclared, unacknowledged, and illegitimate series of actions that result 
in the same harm as traditional overt warfare.  
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V. FINAL THOUGHTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The capability and capacity of SOF to act in support of a comprehensive whole of 
government approach to Phase Zero should not be undervalued. Particularly, we should 
give thoughtful consideration to the many moral advantages delivered by employing SOF 
in Phase Zero as opposed to subsequent phases of conflict. We might agree that it is morally 
preferable to apply more robust efforts in Phase Zero using SOF than to apply SOF in 
support of traditional military deployments during large-scale combat operations or major 
campaigns. This thesis demonstrated that in both scenarios, applying SOF would increase 
the likelihood of positive outcomes, at least from a moral perspective, and therefore both 
objectives represent worthwhile investments. However, it should also be clear that we have 
the potential to get a much higher return on our investments by choosing to capitalize on a 
morally superior objective in Phase Zero.  
This thesis only scratched the surface of what needs to become a key academic 
focus area for subsequent just war theory discourse. It is clear that just war theory, neither 
traditional nor revisionist, has yet to sufficiently address how governments—let alone 
militaries and SOF—should justly compete below the level of armed conflict. 
Understandably, this question of morality in competition may represent somewhat of a 
logical Pandora’s Box—where does normal interaction end and competition below the 
level of armed conflict begin? Further, if the answer is not clear—are we still expanding 
just war theory or are we describing a new theory altogether? This means that, at a bare 
minimum, we are in need of an evolution of the just war theoretical framework. Both to 
sufficiently treat the issues of jus ad conflictum and jus in conflictus, and to develop and 
articulate the appropriate moral norms for contemporary and future indirect and irregular 
conflict short of overt warfare. Although this thesis has identified some clear moral criteria 
and principles that would likely fall within such an expansion, there is by all accounts much 
more work to be done to advance how we conceptualize these complex moral issues in a 
contemporary operating environment fraught with further difficulty.  
While this thesis by no means approaches completeness in addressing the moral 
criteria and principles required to correctly frame jus ad conflictum or jus in conflictus, it 
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should be evident—even by the limited treatment given—that Russia’s actions in Ukraine 
constitute a violation of the basic principles outlined. Of course, it is impossible to know 
what could have been had the U.S. undertaken a more serious Phase Zero approach at the 
conclusion of the Cold War—or even during the Revolution of Dignity in early 2014. It is 
possible that this could have made U.S. extended and Ukrainian deterrence more effective, 
but it is also possible that Russia might have covertly acted to seize Crimea regardless. In 
either case, the U.S.—or any other nation for that matter—would have been morally 
justified under jus ad conflictum to execute Phase Zero campaign activities in an attempt 
to support Ukraine in its sovereignty, autonomy, and right to self-determination.  
A. IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The proposed expansion of just war theory requires subsequent research. The 
sincere aim of this work is to encourage a more thorough and robust discussion about the 
morality of SOF, most certainly when applied to Phase Zero. The proposed moral elements 
of activities below the level of armed conflict, jus ad conflictum and jus in conflictus, could 
be applied to more historical cases—but perhaps more importantly, to contemporary ones 
as there may be sufficient time to change the outcome. This thesis only applies the concepts 
to one state actor, but there may be even more strength in applying these considerations to 
non-state actors. For example, networks who seek to influence or terrorize the populations 
of state actors. In some characterizations of network type actors, they seem to succeed in 
executing something of a perpetual Phase Zero until they have set conditions appropriately, 
sometimes after long periods of time, to achieve their goals. These types of considerations 
might be a good venue to apply the proposed moral evaluations to both adversarial 
networks and the state actors who might seek to undermine theses networks in Phase Zero.  
On the practical side, subsequent research might examine the U.S. inter-
governmental or the whole of government approach to Phase Zero. If the logic proposed in 
this thesis is sufficient, we may wish to look closely at our own processes and functions to 
better apply government resources in a more collaborative way as Fussell and Lee 
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suggest.180 Further, it may be just as important to reconfigure our internal networks to 
better understand the morality of SOF employment in actions below the level of armed 
conflict. This could play a very important role in reducing the disutility of our post-Cold 
War deterrence approach as well as bounding the manner in which networks can drastically 
effect state sovereignty, war, and peace—both concepts identified by Arquilla.181 
Further research on the moral aspect of the proposed expansion may rightly focus 
on the importance of questions about liability in Phase Zero. Traditional and revisionist 
elements of just war theory are clearly present in the ideas of jus ad conflictum and jus in 
conflictus. This thesis does not focus on which is more appropriate, rather that they can 
both be applied. If we can agree that competition below the level of armed conflict is 
sometimes justifiable, but is also always subject to moral criticism—then we might ask, 
as Straswer did, who should die in Phase Zero? If there is a difference in competition 
below the level of armed conflict and armed conflict, which this thesis argued for in the 
affirmatory, then there must also be a difference in preventative force and preventative 
war.  
B. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Given the morally advantageous characterization of SOF employment in Phase 
Zero applied in this thesis, it may be in our best interest to examine U.S. Public Law. 
Specifically, Title 22 and Title 10 may need minor revisions or expansions to tidy up the 
relationships between the DOS and DoD in Phase Zero outside of overseas contingency 
operations like Afghanistan or Iraq. Further, the U.S. government may need to make a clear 
policy toward bad-actors. For example, the U.S. policy toward the Democratic People’s 
Republic of North Korea is somewhat vague and undefined in terms of the desired endstate. 
Without an articulated endstate defined by the U.S. Executive and Legislative branches of 
government, it is impossible to conduct Phase Zero with respect to the long-game. A 
                                                 
180 Lee and Fussell, “Networks at War: Organizational Innovation and Adaptation in the 21st 
Century.” 
181 Arquilla, “Bound to Fail”; Arquilla, “The (B)End of History.” 
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defined endstate would allow the DOS to develop a strategy that DoD could support with 
SOF capability in Phase Zero.  
DOS Foreign Affairs capacity and capability may need to be increased as former 
SECDEF Robert Gates argued for during his tenure.182 SOF are not the only actors in 
Phase Zero, the DOS must be resourced adequately for this type of application in both a 
human resources and financial perspective. DOS diplomatic missions abroad must have 
the personnel and expertise to recognize the moral utility of developing more 
comprehensive integrated country strategies that include SOF Phase Zero tranches to more 
effectively manage the status quo.  
The DoD, SOCOM in particular, must also adequately resource the indirect 
approach. This may mean prioritizing the indirect approach higher than the direct, which 
is admittedly no small task in the contemporary environment’s requirements for SOF. 
Metaphorically speaking, if the direct approach is equivalent to cutting the grass then it is 
important to understand that it will most certainly grow back. However, if the indirect 
approach can influence the environment—then we can change the landscape completely 
and make it much more difficult for the grass to survive in certain situations or settings. 
Clearly, in this logic the approach must be balanced by the requirements of the environment 
meaning that the direct approach must not be abandoned—rather we will need both 
landscapers and grass-cutters to complete the task.  
C. FINAL THOUGHTS 
Thinking back to Chapter IV, if we apply the proposed expansions to just war 
theory contained herein we can more accurately, and morally, describe the environment 
known as the Gray Zone.183 It is always advantageous to more completely understand 
contemporary challenges, both emergent and persistent, before devising potential 
solutions. Even if the logic applied in this thesis is applied to past Phase Zero operations 
and determines them to have been unjust acts of aggression—then the logic provided in 
                                                 
182 Tyson, “Gates Urges Increased Funding for Diplomacy.” 
183 Kapusta, “The Gray Zone.” 
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Chapter III also presents a solution. While, at least in Russia’s foray into Ukraine, it appears 
unlikely that Russia might dislodge its military forces without traditional large-scale 
combat operations, Phase Zero offers a potential irregular solution in that it might raise the 
cost to an unbearable level and force a withdrawal—much as insurgency forced the Russian 
withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989. The application of SOF in Phase Zero could greatly 
disrupt the Russian propaganda machine and facilitate transparency to a degree that might 
leave Russia’s ideological position untenable and precipitate positive change. SOF applied 
in Phase Zero to the South China Sea issue might also be viewed as another potential 
solution. Properly attributing Chinese corporations or their subsidiaries hired to construct 
island military bases could lead to precisely leveled sanctions with the potential to disrupt 
the entire aim of territorial expansion. It is for these reasons that I am hopeful for the future, 
things that are done are not done forever—and SOF in Phase Zero, although incremental 
in nature, can build the foundation of positive change through their ethical application in 
modern conflict.  
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